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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following hypothetical. A customer enters a "big-
box" store such as Wal-Mart and purchases a number of items.' At the
register, the clerk hands the customer the receipt; he places it in his
wallet, puts the wallet in his pocket, picks up his bag, and heads to the
store exit. He is met at the door by a store employee who is asking to
* Associate Professor, Phoenix School of Law. J.D., Baylor University School of Law,
1999; M.S. in Environmental Biology, Baylor University, 1996; B.S. in Biology/Environmen-
tal Studies, Baylor University, 1994. The author thanks her colleagues MaryAnn Pierce,
Steve Gerst, and Ann Woodley for their helpful comments. She also thanks Jeff Hall for his
research help. Finally, she thanks her husband, Dennis, for his never-ending support and
encouragement.
1. BOB ORTEGA, IN SAM WE TRUST: THE UNTOLD STORY OF SAM WALTON AND How
WAL-MART IS DEVOURING AMERICA xv (1998). These stores are called "big-box" stores
because they resemble gigantic large windowless boxes that provide little aesthetically
either inside or outside. Their sole purpose is to house consumer goods for quick turn-over.
Some examples are Wal-Mart, "K-Mart, Target, Toys 'R' Us, Home Depot, OfficeMax,
Staples, CompUSA, Circuit City, Food Lion, Price Chopper, Barnes & Noble, Borders,
Blockbuster Video, Rite-Aid, Petsmart, and many, many more."
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
verify the receipt of every person leaving the store. The customer ref-
uses, the employee calls security, and the customer is detained.2 This
hypothetical may end several different ways. One customer shows the
receipt legitimizing his purchases and is permitted to leave. Another
customer may do the same but vows never to undergo that indignity or
delay again. Occasionally, the store's policy of demanding receipts
ends with yet another customer being caught for shoplifting. Other
times, the customer might further refuse and the store employees al-
low him to leave.
Now, imagine that the hypothetical customer has a name-
Michael Righi-and the shopping excursion ends with Mr. Righi sit-
ting in the county jail for failing to show his receipt. 3 In this final
instance, the stop likely will end in a false imprisonment lawsuit
against the store for its unlawful detention of its customer.
This issue, though seemingly well-settled under the doctrines of
false imprisonment and shopkeeper's license, has raised a huge public
outcry. On July 17, 2008, a Google Internet search for the question
"Can Wal-Mart demand to see my receipt?" resulted in over 500,000
hits.4 Many of those Internet links encouraged "civil disobedience"
from both the store's policies and authoritative requests to prove the
customer was not stealing.5 Most sites simply dealt with the annoy-
ance of consumers forced to wait in one more line to prove up their
purchases before they were permitted to leave. Others asserted a very
real concern about the invasion of personal liberty.6 In the past, when
2. See, e.g., Dan Higgins, Consumerist Documents Wal-Mart Receipt Checking
Zealotry, (June 10, 2008), available at http://blogs.timesunion.com/advocate/?p=238
(numerous internet weblogs describe exactly this scenario); Dennis Rockstroh, Receipt
Checkpoints: Are They Necessary?, (May 18, 2005), available at http://blogs.mercurynews.
com/consumeractionline/2005/05/18/receiptLcheckpo/ (noting that a call to a Wal-Mart
manager following such an altercation got nowhere because the manager "could not change
[Wal-Mart's] corporate policy"); Best Buy: "Sir we need to see your receipt" You: "Um, no
you don't," http://reddit.com/info/sxly/comments (last visited July 18, 2008); Receipt
Checkers, Google Groups, http://groups.google.com/ (search "Receipt Checkers"; then follow
"Receipt Checkers" hyperlink) (last visited July 18, 2008).
3. Michael Righi, Papers Please: Arrested at Circuit City, Sept. 1, 2007 http://www.
michaelrighi.com/2007/09/01/arrested-at-circuit-city/ (last visited May 2, 2009).
4. Wal-Mart's receipt-checking policy is formally called "Asset Protection Exit Greeter
Program" and was piloted in Las Vegas, Nevada. Senta Scarborough, Police Say Wal-Mart
Snubbed Efforts to Cut Shoplifting, ARiz. REPUBLIC (June 27, 2008).
5. See, e.g., Chad Everett, Don't Back Down: Civil Disobedience at Wal-Mart,
(Nov. 14, 2006), http://jayseae.cxliv.org/2006/11/14/civil disobedience at wal-mart.html
(questioning whether a store like Wal-Mart has the economic power to mandate policy in
contravention to known retail practices).
6. The impact of a forced detention and search is not limited to annoyance or
indignation. One commentator noted that the vast majority of individuals surveyed after
they had given consent to a search often felt very negatively about the encounter. Janice
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corporations engaged in illegal activity or violated individual rights,
the law, often through tort claims such as false imprisonment, had the
force of stopping the intrusion on personal rights. But today, a new
mechanism may be replacing the law as the means of social control.
This Article will show, at the very least, receipt-checking
amounts to an illegal detention under settled tort law. More troubling,
however, is the possibility that the big-box stores know the illegality of
their receipt-checking practices but choose to ignore both customer loss
and litigation risk in favor of a policy that reduces theft. The question
is what incentive will stop companies from enforcing their illegal poli-
cies? Consumer buying power, not the law, is the mechanism that best
protects individual rights. In other words, economic powers answer to
the only threat they appreciate-economic force. And when it comes to
the bottom line, any policy that delivers economically will trump all
others.
Sam Walton, the frugal founder of the un-matched Wal-Mart
empire, supposedly embraced the folksy door-greeter concept, not be-
cause it made customers feel welcome, but because it was one of the
cheapest ways to deal with a consistent shoplifting problem. 7 Retailers
will. take advantage of every shrinkage-reducing policy they can, but
will they also deliberately break the law as a matter of policy if it im-
proves the bottom line? Given the reality of receipt-checking, the
answer is probably "yes."
Through unparalleled economic power, big-box stores have the
ability to ignore legal limitations. As long as consumers consent to un-
lawful policies to get a better price, these stores have no incentive to
change. The only mechanism of change that will provide an incentive
is consumer dissatisfaction. Litigation may not prevent unlawful de-
tentions related to receipt-checking, but enough consumer complaints
Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153,
211-13 (2002).
7. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 202:
Take the company's door greeters, those aggressively friendly and often
superannuated workers who stand at the entrance to every Wal-Mart store, saying
hello to customers as they come in and asking if they need help finding something.
By company lore, a store manager in Crowley, Louisiana, first came up with the
idea. When Sam Walton visited the store in 1980, he was so enchanted with the
notion that he decreed that all stores should have greeters, because it sent a warm,
friendly message to shoppers. All this was essentially true. But-as shouldn't be
surprising-there was a more bottom-line reason Walton loved the idea: The
Crowley store had a major shoplifting problem; and the greeter kept an eye on people
leaving to make sure they weren't walking out with anything they hadn't paid for.
Dan McAllister, the manager, figured it would be less jarring to customers to be
greeted by an old codger than by, say, a uniformed guard.
That was what Walton loved about the idea: It cut down on shoplifting. The
warm-and-fuzzy image boost was just gravy.
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just might. This single tort, and its inability to keep a Goliath like
Wal-Mart in check is an example of how consumer power, instead of
the law, has become the dominant check on personal rights intrusions.8
This Article will first explore the legality of store policies requir-
ing patrons to show their receipts before they leave a store. While the
general public expresses outrage at the new policies employed by the
stores, one commentator noted that many stores are not even aware of
the laws that govern their behavior toward their own patrons.9 Those
stores, while decreasing their losses from theft, are not only alienating
their honest customers, but they are also breaking the law. This Arti-
cle will show why receipt-checking is an unlawful detention. Part II
will investigate the history of false imprisonment and anti-theft prac-
tices. Part III will explore whether receipt-checking constitutes a
detention for purposes of false imprisonment. Part IV will consider the
applicability and inaccurate reliance on the shopkeeper's license stat-
utes. Part V will discuss the dangers of such policies and why
corporations should avoid receipt-checking.
The Article will also consider how these illegal policies end up
having the force and effect of legitimate law when they are used by
economic powers such as the big-box stores. Part VI will explore the
phenomenon of the big-box store by analyzing Wal-Mart as a case
study and considering whether economic power gives it the ability to
ignore the law through the use of internal store policies alone.
II. CURRENT ANTI-THEFT PRACTICES
Shoplifting theft in the United States is no small portion of rev-
enue losses. According to the 2006 National Retail Security Survey
Annual Report (2006 National Report), an annual survey conducted by
8. This Article does not examine Wal-Mart's direct changing of the law through its
own litigation practices. Instead, it considers how Wal-Mart's economic power results in a
de facto disregard or change of the law. For a more complete discussion of how Wal-Mart's
litigation practices shape the law, see Lea S. VanderVelde, Wal-Mart as a Phenomenon in
the Legal World: Matters of Scale, Scale Matters 1-44 (UNIV. IOWA LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER,
Paper No. 05-36, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876985. Vandervelde
considers how Wal-Mart shapes the legal landscape by being a "repeat player in the courts."
Under her reasoning, "[riepeat players could selectively shift their litigation resources to
nudge the law in a favorable direction." Id. at 2. In 2006, her search of the public record
showed Wal-Mart as a party in 3,034 reported cases, suggesting at least twice that many
more were unreported. Id. at 6. Accordingly, Wal-Mart has become a significant repeat
player.
9. Note, The Merchant, the Shoplifter and the Law, 55 MINN. L. REV. 825, 827 (1971)
("[Miost merchants are not aware of the state laws affecting their rights to accuse,
apprehend, and arrest suspected shoplifters.").
Vol. 4: 1:1
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the University of Florida of 150 retail chains, including the "top 100,"
retail theft cost merchants more than $40.5 billion in 2006.10 The re-
tailers responding to the survey reported that 1.57% of total annual
sales were lost to theft.1 1 Thirteen billion dollars of retail losses are
attributable to shoplifting alone. 12 Those losses, in turn, are passed on
to consumers who then suffer higher prices. 13 The largest areas of re-
tail theft included 47% of employee theft and 32% of theft committed
by others. 14 While employee theft generally represents a higher per-
centage of dollar losses, the number of shoplifting cases is much
higher.15 Each shoplifting incident usually results in a smaller dollar
loss, but even that trend is changing. 16 The average loss per shoplifter
is increasing over time. 17 Commentators estimate that the losses con-
tributable to shoplifting will soon outweigh those due to employee
theft.' 8 Accordingly, stores have an interest in controlling their losses,
and managing theft is a large portion of that goal.
Despite the numbers indicating a trend toward more shoplifting
incidents and greater losses per occurrence, arrests and convictions of
shoplifters are decreasing. In 2006, retailers reported an average of
only 62.1 apprehensions for every $100 million in sales. 19 Enforcement
actions have dropped even more precipitously. Shoplifting prosecu-
tions are down to an average of only 18.1 for every $100 million in
sales. 20 Some stores have announced policies that they will prosecute
even less. For example, Wal-Mart indicated it would not attempt to
prosecute any case that resulted in less than $25 of merchandise sto-
10. 2006 National Retail Security Survey Final Report, Security Research Project
(Dept. of Criminology, Law, and Society, University of Florida), at 6 (2007) [hereinafter
2006 National Report].
11. Id. Interestingly, the percentage of theft has actually decreased since the late
1990s, perhaps showing that increases in theft deterrents are having a positive affect.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id.
14. Id. This Article does not address the validity of searching employees, the largest
source of inventory loss. At least as far as employee searches are concerned, the
reasonableness of the search seems to hinge on whether the employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Victor Schachter, Privacy in the Workplace, 828 PLIIPAT
153, 217 (2005) ("Employee expectations of privacy represent the most effective way to avoid
workplace search liability."). Receipt-checking may be equally as efficient in deterring
employee theft as it is deterring shoplifters.
15. 2006 National Report, supra note 10, at 26.
16. Id. at 28. The 2006 National Report indicated that the average shoplifting loss rose
from an average of $265.40 in 2003, to $621.67 in 2004, to $802.83 in 2005.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 26.
20. Id. at 28.
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len. 21 This reluctance to arrest and prosecute shoplifters in the face of
increasing theft losses is probably a reflection of many competing inter-
ests. Merchants have long recognized the down-side to arresting and
detaining suspected shoplifters-potential danger to employees, the
cost of surveillance, and the loss of alienated customers who are mis-
takenly accused of the crime. 22 Others let inventory control suffer
because they do not understand their legal right to stop and detain
suspected thieves.23 Many merchants are fearful of false-arrest and
false imprisonment claims made against them.24 Thus, while theft in-
creases, stores display a reluctance to increase shoplifting
apprehensions. Instead, they are turning to deterrence mechanisms to
reduce theft.
The best tool to avoid liability and deter consumer theft is a
firm policy in place that complies with the law and anticipates shop-
lifter resistance. 25 However, the most efficient anti-theft policies
capture thieves without invading the rights of innocent shoppers. The
response to the balance between limiting theft and avoiding backlash
from an overly aggressive anti-theft policy is to shift theft prevention
away from arrest and prosecution after the crime has occurred toward
an early-intervention-and-prevention program aimed at all shoppers
before they decide to steal. The target of the security system has
shifted from the known or suspected shoplifter to the potential shop-
lifter, which includes every customer in the store. Statistically,
deterrent programs work. Several studies have noted that calling at-
tention to theft through anti-shoplifting signs deterred it.26
Accordingly, stores are becoming more aggressive in their front-end de-
terrent inventory-control practices.
21. Id.
22. Thomas Elkind & Alan D. Axelrod, Note, Merchants' Responses to Shoplifting: An
Empirical Study, 28 STAN. L. REV. 589, 589 (1976).
23. Id. at 600.
24. Id.
25. Thomas Brad Bishop, Excerpts From The Law of Shoplifting: A Guide for Lawyers
and Merchants, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 43, 62 (1989).
26. Ned Carter et al., Shoplifting Reduction Through the Use of Specific Signs, 2 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. MGMT. 73, 84 (1979); Ned Carter & Bo Holmberg, Theft Reduction
in a Grocery Store Through Product Identification, 13 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. MGMT.
129, 135 (1992); M. Patrick McNees et al., Shoplifting Prevention: Providing Information
Through Signs, 9 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIs 399, 405 (1976); But see Sharlet D.
Butterfield, Examining the Effects of a Low-Cost Prompt to Reduce Retail Theft (Dec. 2004)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nevada Reno) (on file with author) (replicating past
studies and finding there was no significant theft deterrence in most instances).
Vol. 4: 1:1
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There are many types of loss prevention systems, and the firms
surveyed for the 2006 National Report used several at a time.27 As the
focus of anti-theft programs shift from apprehension to prevention, the
mechanisms employed by retailers tend to shift as well. In the 1950s-
1970s, when stores targeted actual shoplifters, they hired plainclothes
detectives to arrest individuals who stole.28 Other similar systems
ranged from the sole merchant watching customers carefully as they
shopped in the corner store to elaborate surveillance systems involving
hidden cameras, alarms, and undercover security to catch thieves in
the act. Usually, the larger the store and the more valuable the inven-
tory, the more sophisticated the security system. Today, stores create
a strong police or guard presence that discourages theft before the ille-
gal activity begins. As a result, the new mechanisms place an
emphasis on hiring roaming security, door greeters, and receipt check-
ers to warn potential shoplifters that they are being watched. Twenty-
two and a half percent of retailers who responded to the survey indi-
cated they used door greeters or receipt checkers as a source for loss
prevention. 29
While receipt checkers are valued for their high-profile deter-
rence, they provide a secondary cost to the business. The down-side to
a policy such as receipt-checking is that it targets and impacts all
shoppers rather than the few who are likely to be stealing. Receipt
checking either deters or captures a wider group of shoplifters, which
is a positive result. But it also creates the potential that more innocent
customers become involved in detention and searches where they
might not have before. Under a strong receipt-checking system, every
customer will be detained long enough to at least ask for the receipt,
and that receipt (and purchase) sometimes may be subject to search.
Customers who refuse to comply with the policy may suffer additional
27. 2006 National Report, supra note 10, at 23. The following list details the types of
loss prevention programs and the percentage of responding retailers who utilize each:
Burglar alarm (95.4), digital recording system (86.1), live, visible CCTV (86.1), POS data
mining software (69.5), armored car deposit pickups (69.5), check approval systems (62.3),
remote CCTV video and audio (58.3), live, hidden CCTV (57.6), drop safes (55), security
display fixtures (51.7), uniformed guards (50.7), cables, locks, and chains (45.7), acousto-
magnetic, electronic security tags (45.7), mystery/honesty shopper (45), web-based case
management/reporting (43.7), silent alarms (42.4), plain clothes store detective (39.1),
shoplifting deterrence signs (37.7), observation mirrors (37.7), RF electronic security tags
(35.8), ink/dye benefit denial tags (34.4), merchandise alarms (34.4), simulated, visible
CCTV (29.1), POS exception-based CCTV interface (28.5), door greeter/receipt checker
(22.5), timed entry safes (19.2), vendor/source acousto-magnetic tags (18.5), fitting room
attendants (17.9), vendor/source RF tagging (14.6), microwave electronic security tags
(14.6), observation booths (6), and RFID tags (4).
28. Elkind, supra note 22, at 596.
29. 2006 National Report, supra note 10, at 23.
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extended detentions and searches based solely on their refusal. In the
past, companies carefully balanced theft deterrence against the burden
to the innocent shopper and often avoided policies and procedures that
might have alienated their customers. For example, in a 1953 article
published by the Yale Law Journal, the authors opined "[t]he
merchant's desire to maintain good public relations will probably serve
as a practical restraint on arbitrary detention."30 Now, however, these
policies and procedures are employed as a matter of course because
they provide a significant deterrent effect. At the end of the day, it is
the bottom line that matters, and if a few customers are lost by the
offensive policies, the companies are prepared to take those losses in
exchange for lower theft rates.3 1
III. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
While detaining a customer suspected of shoplifting may give
rise to numerous potential causes of action, including false arrest,
32
assault,33 battery,34 slander,35 libel,36 and malicious prosecution,37 this
Article focuses primarily on false imprisonment. 38 False imprisonment
causes of action require a plaintiff to prove that another person has
detained him against his will without authority of law. 39 That deten-
30. Note, Shoplifting and The Law of Arrest: The Merchant's Dilemma, 62 YALE L. J.
788, 803 (1953).
31. CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL
COMPANY REALLY WORKS-AND How IT'S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 203
(2006) ("Wal-Mart is relentless at measuring its own costs; it isn't so interested in
measuring its customers' costs.").
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (Deluxe 8th Ed. 2004) ("An arrest made without legal
authority.").
33. Id. at 122 ("The threat or use of force on another that causes that person to have a
reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact ....").
34. Id. at 162 ("The use of force against another, resulting in harmful or offensive
contact.").
35. Id. at 1421 ("A defamatory assertion expressed in a transitory form, esp. speech.").
36. Id. at 934 ("A defamatory statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp. writing but
also a picture, sign, or electronic broadcast.").
37. Id. at 977 ("The institution of a criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose
and without probable cause.").
38. Discussion is limited in this Article to false imprisonment as the primary civil
remedy for unlawful detentions by store employees. It does not explore the possibility of
Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations. At least one court has noted, however, that § 1983
may give rise to a constitutional claim when the store employee is acting under the color of
state law. Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, 2005 Fed. App. 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, merchants should consider that their activities have implications beyond the
discreet tort of false imprisonment discussed here.
39. See Moore's Inc. v. Garcia, 604 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1980).
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tion must be to a fixed boundary, and there must be no reasonable
means of escape. 40 Detention may be the result of coercion, physical
barriers, or use of physical force. 41 Furthermore, the detention need
not be for an appreciable amount of time, nor cause physical harm. 42
The elements of false imprisonment include intent to confine, confine-
ment directly or indirectly resulting from the intent to confine, and
awareness by the plaintiff of the confinement. 43 In short, the plaintiff
must be trapped against his will. False imprisonment arises in shop-
lifting cases when plaintiffs are detained to investigate the shoplifting
allegation. 44
Any shoplifting investigation opens the door for an unlawful de-
tention claim. Actual shoplifters, even if originally lawfully detained
to investigate a crime, may assert a claim if the shopkeeper exceeds the
scope of the detention or detains in an unreasonable manner. In con-
trast, a receipt-checking policy may give rise to an unlawful detention
claim the moment the request is made. These policies create several
specific opportunities for detention problems. First, the mere request
to see the receipt may qualify as an unreasonable detention in many
circumstances. Second, the production of the receipt by the customer,
either willingly or under pressure, takes time. Finally, a detention
may result from a refusal to produce a receipt. The difference between
these detentions and more traditional false-imprisonment claims is
that they affect all customers, not just those suspected of theft. Ac-
cordingly, the potential harm and litigation risk increases. Therefore,
each detention, and the liability it may impose, should be considered
independently.
A. Critical Stops
1. Stop 1: Requesting a Receipt (Detention?)
The first issue is whether the initial technical stop to make a
receipt request qualifies as an unlawful detention that raises false im-
40. See Harvey Co. v. Speight, 344 S.E.2d 701, 813 (Ga. App. 1986).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 at 52 (1965).
44. Shoplifting is defined as the willful taking of merchandise offered for sale without
payment. BLAci's, supra note 32, at 1412. "[L]arceny of goods from a store or other
commercial establishment by willfully taking and concealing the merchandise with the
intention of converting the goods to one's personal use without paying the purchase price."
Some jurisdictions do not contain specific shoplifting statutes, but instead, criminalize
shoplifting as a portion of the general theft statute.
2009
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prisonment on its own. As a general rule, the detention need not be for
any appreciable amount of time to give rise to a claim.45 Unlawful re-
straint is the stopping of the suspect's freedom of movement or action
or an unlawful taking of his choice to leave. 46 Clearly, if a customer is
physically stopped to search her bags or her person, a detention has
taken place. In most cases, physical detention and physical search are
easy to prove. But where the detention is only the time it takes to
make the receipt request, the issue is less clear.
Courts have recognized that psychological or social pressures
are often enough to effectuate non-consensual detentions. 47 When a
store places employees at its doors and stops customers as they exit,
many patrons may feel they are not entitled to leave until they at least
hear what the employee has to say. The apparent authority of the
store employee and the employee's location at the exit create a psycho-
logical pressure to stop and listen to the request, even if the customer
decides not to honor it.48
Some stores even have physical barriers that "herd" customers
through a line and directly to the waiting employee. Given the fact
that receipt-checking takes time, lines often form at these checkpoints
and patrons are physically, psychologically, or socially forced to wait to
hear the request before they receive implicit permission to leave. Each
of these examples is a technical detention, no matter how brief. The
issue is whether that detention, merely for the purpose of requesting a
receipt, is unreasonable.
Many customers argue that they should not be stopped at all, or
should not have to wait in line to show an employee proof of
purchase. 49 For those customers, the period of time it takes to comply
with the store policy is unreasonable, no matter how short in duration
it may be. Some courts agree. In West v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the
court held detention to make a shoplifting inquiry, without any cor-
roborating evidence of shoplifting, was an unreasonable detention.50
There, the plaintiffs tried to leave the store carrying a bag of dog food
45. Harvey, 344 S.E.2d at 813.
46. Moore's Inc. v. Garcia, 604 S.W. 2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1980); Moore v. Pay'N Save
Corp., 581 P.2d 159, 162 (Wash. App. 1978).
47. Meadows v. Woolworth Co., 254 F. Supp. 907, 909 (ND Fla. 1966).
48. On principle, many customers who are aware of these store policies, including this
author, regularly refuse to stop even for the period it takes to make the demand. Such
behavior may then become the basis for a belief that a theft is taking place simply because
all other customers are conforming to the initial detention.




too large to be placed in a sack.51 A manager stopped them and de-
manded to see their receipt.52  The inspection also included
questioning check-out clerks who were near the door.5 3 When the sale
was verified, the manager apologized for the inconvenience. 54 The trial
court determined that the stop was wholly inappropriate because the
plaintiffs never displayed furtive appearance or suspicious conduct.55
There was nothing irregular about the transaction or the position of
the dog food, and it was not customary to place such a large item in a
sack.56 In short, the mere inquiry and the brief span of time the in-
quiry took amounted to false imprisonment because there was no
reasonable suspicion to stop the shopper in the first place.5 7 Such a
holding seems to indicate that retailers are not entitled to stop and
request a receipt unless some corroborating facts give rise to a belief
that the person is shoplifting. Mere presence in the store, or making
purchases in the store, is not enough to justify a detention of this type.
In any jurisdiction following this principle, every receipt request made
without actual suspicion of theft automatically gives rise to a false-im-
prisonment claim.
In response, corporations argue that merely asking for a receipt
is not a detention on its face, so long as the store has no intention to
detain if the customer declines. In Mendoza v. K-Mart Inc., the Tenth
Circuit held employees did not have the intent to detain, even though
they stopped the customer to inquire about shoplifting, because the
employee let the consumer walk away from the discussion.58 Because
the intent to detain is an element of false imprisonment, no cause of
action accrued with the inquiry alone. Implicitly, the time it took to
make the request did not amount to a detention. Likewise, in Williams
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee who saw a customer drop loose candy into a bag did not detain
51. Id. at 1259-60.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 49 at 1260.
54. Id.
55. West, 539 So. 2d. at 1261.
56. Id.
57. See also Crase v. Highland Vill. Value Plus Pharmacy, 374 N.E.2d 58, 60-61 (Ind.
App. 1978) (holding that when a customer was detained to inquire about a piece of missing
merchandise, there was an inference of unlawful detention even though she was
immediately released when she stated she had no knowledge of the issue).
58. Mendoza v. K-Mart, Inc., 587 F.2d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Swetnam v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 318 P.2d 364, 366 (Ariz. 1957); Tocker v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 190
A.2d 822, 824 (D.C. 1963); Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 174 N.W.2d 765, 766-67 (Mich.
1970).
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the individual by asking about the contents of the bag.59 Again, the
questions, and the time it took to ask them, were not detentions.
Under this logic, asking customers to produce a receipt upon leaving
the store, though annoying to the consumer, may not be a violation of
any law, provided the employee does not intend to detain the customer
if he refuses. But because courts are following the premise that "there
is no harm in asking," these holdings assume that a customer will be
allowed to refuse the request. Thus, stores in these jurisdictions may
carefully craft receipt-checking policies to get the deterrent effect as
long as they have no intent to further detain.
Yet even if the store is entitled to initially stop the customer
long enough to demand the receipt under the "no harm in asking" pol-
icy, the next step of the confrontation may give rise to a new false-
imprisonment claim.
2. Stop 2: Checking the Receipt (Consent?)
Stop two involves the second detention (and initial search)-the
time it takes for the shopper to find the receipt, produce it for the em-
ployee, and have the employee check it. Because the first detention
was essentially a request for consent to search, the customer, even
under the "no harm in asking" jurisdictions, should always retain the
right to refuse that consent, or refuse to hand over the receipt. In fact,
refusal of consent to search is a constitutionally-protected right when
state actors are involved.60 Courts have upheld a similar rule in pri-
vate encounters. In the Williams case above, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held the employee's question concerning the contents of the sus-
pect's bag was lawful; however, the moment the plaintiff declined to
answer or refused to consent to search the bag, legal justification for
the detention ended.61 There was no harm in asking, but if the patron
did not give consent to further investigation, the transaction had to
59. Williams v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 242 So. 2d 16, 18 (La. 1970) (noting that the lack
of detention only continued through the initial investigatory question, and the moment the
customer stated she had purchased the candy, the court held the further detention was
unlawful).
60. See Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98
(1983); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Kenneth J. Melilli, The
Consequences of Refusing Consent to a Search or Seizure: The Unfortunate
Constitutionalization of an Evidentiary Issue, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 922 (2002) (suggesting
that the right to refuse consent comes from evidentiary rules, not constitutional rights, but
agreeing that a mere refusal to give consent cannot be introduced as a basis for probable
cause or reasonable suspicion for a further search or detention).
61. Williams, 242 So. 2d at 18-19.
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end. Accordingly, a security policy that allows the enforcing employee
to demand the receipt, but then requires her to let the customer leave,
protects the right to refuse consent. The key is the shopper's opportu-
nity to exercise the right.
Generally, consensual detentions and searches do not raise
false-imprisonment concerns because a key element of the cause of ac-
tion-detention against the plaintiffs will-has been defeated.
62
Nevertheless, consent hinges on voluntary participation by the ac-
cused. Under a "no harm in asking" policy, some shoplifters will be
caught, even when they had the option to deny the request, because
they freely give consent anyway. Guilty suspects often consent to a
detention and search, thinking that if they do so, the retailer's suspi-
cions will be allayed and the search will not actually take place. 6
3
Others may comply in the hope that returning the merchandise and
expressing remorse will encourage the merchant to forgive the trans-
gression and release them.64
Similarly, non-guilty parties may freely give consent because
they have nothing to hide, and they do not mind the minimal intrusion
for the sake of inventory control. In fact, many web-log participants
argue that they freely give consent because it reduces theft, which in
turn helps keep retail prices low. 65 Regardless of the reason, once con-
sent is freely given, the underlying unlawful detention is gone because
the consenting customer is not being held against his will.66 As in
criminal law, consent cures the illegality of the detention. This concept
62. See e.g., Gaffney v. Payless Drug Stores, 492 P.2d 474, 475-76 (1972) (holding a
shopper consented to her detention when she agreed to return to a store and show the store
manager she had not stolen anything).
63. The phenomenon has been noted in the Fourth Amendment context. John M.
Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109 (2007) (labeling these consenters as
"tactical optimists" and arguing they must reason: "If I say 'yes' then he won't be suspicious
anymore because I am being so cooperative, and then maybe-just maybe-he won't really
search me after all because I have made it clear by my consent that I must be above
suspicion."); see also People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1143 (Cal. 1997) ("[A defendant] may
wish to appear cooperative in order to throw the police off the scent or at least lull them into
conducting a superficial search . . ").
64. Bishop, supra note 25, at 63.
65. See, e.g., Dan Higgins, Consumerist Documents Wal-Mart Receipt Checking
Zealotry, (June 10, 2008), http://blogs.timesunion.com/advocate/?p=238; Dennis Rockstroh,
Receipt Checkpoints: Are They Necessary?, (May 18, 2005), available at http://blogs.
mercurynews.com/consumeractionline/2005/05/18/receipLcheckpo/ (noting that a call to a
Wal-Mart manager following such an altercation got nowhere because the manager "could
not change [Wal-Mart's] corporate policy"); Best Buy: "Sir we need to see your receipt" You:
"Um, no you don't," http://reddit.cominfo/sxly/comments (last visited July 18, 2008);
Receipt Checkers, Google Groups, http://groups.google.com/ (search "Receipt Checkers";
then follow "Receipt Checkers" hyperlink) (last visited July 18, 2008).
66. Grayson Variety Store Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky. 1966).
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also distinguishes most warehouse store receipt checks (such as Costco
or Sam's Club) where members sign a membership contract agreeing to
consent to search each time they leave the store.
67
But like other areas of the law, if the suspect has no real choice
to offer consent, the technical granting of it does not provide an effec-
tive bar to the false-imprisonment claim.68 As discussed above in
regard to brief detentions to request a receipt, when psychological or
social pressures are high, retailers may effectuate non-consensual de-
tentions to produce the receipt.69 A policy of placing employees at the
exit and stopping customers as they leave creates an atmosphere
where patrons may feel they have no real choice but to hand over the
receipt. The apparent authority of the store employee and the em-
ployee's location at the exit may create psychological pressure to
comply with the demand.
For example, in Zohn v. Menard, Inc., the Iowa Court of Ap-
peals questioned the voluntariness of consent when the customer
claimed he was told by store employees that "new store policy" re-
quired it.7° The court also rejected the notion that the brevity of the
search cured any harm.7 ' Commentators believe that apparent au-
thority, even when coupled with a request for search instead of a
demand, may lead the suspect to believe she has no real choice.
72 Psy-
chological studies support the theory and show that "[w]hat currently
passes as voluntary consent ... may actually be the product of an ex-
tensively documented but rarely discussed social phenomenon-the
67. When the legality of receipt-checking is raised, many point to "warehouse" type
stores such as Costco or Sam's Club as evidence of an industry-accepted practice. Those
stores should not, however, be confused with the typical retail store. Warehouse stores are
not open to the general public, and are thus not considered public forums. They also require
membership agreements. Those agreements contain express clauses indicating that
entitlement to shop is predicated on consent to detain for long enough to show the receipt.
See MEMBER BENEFITS & COSTCO SERVICES, November 2007, at 28-9 (on file with author)
(For example, Costco's membership agreement states "[miembership is subject to any and
all rules adopted by Costco." The agreement further states under "general policies" that
"[tlo ensure that all members are correctly charged for the merchandise purchased, all
receipts and merchandise will be inspected as you leave the warehouse").
68. Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermkts, 160 So. 2d 839 (La. 1964).
69. Meadows v. Woolworth Co., 254 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Fla. 1966).
70. Zohn v. Menard, Inc., 598 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Iowa App. 1999) ("We believe Foster's
alleged submission to the employee's asserted authority to search Foster's bag raises a
genuine issue of material fact concerning the involuntariness of the confinement.").
71. Id.
72. Burkoff, supra note 63, at 1114 (arguing that "most people do not have 'the right' to
refuse a request of this sort"-the request is merely a formality (emphasis in original));
Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The First Amendment on the Streets,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1306 (1990) ("[Vlery few persons will have the moxie to assert
their fourth amendment rights in the face of police authority . ").
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tendency of most people to reflexively obey authority figures."73 Ac-
cordingly, law enforcement departments are routinely encouraged to
get consent searches where they would not be entitled to search other-
wise.74 Because courts rarely strike down consensual searches, the
tactic allows police to search without meeting the warrant
requirement. 7
5
Similarly, "obedience theorists" have shown that people tend to
obey orders given by anyone with authority in the social order (teach-
ers, ushers, experimenters), not just those with legal authority
(police). 76 It follows that store customers who are told they must hand
over a receipt before they leave the store will likewise feel the store
employee has the authority to enforce the demand and that the cus-
tomer has no real choice. That apparent authority is exacerbated
when the employee threatens to call the police if the demand is not
met. In effect, the store is using its authority to force the illegal deten-
tion while hiding behind the veil of consent.
Similarly, a customer may feel social pressure to consent to an
illegal detention because he fears being accused of a crime or embar-
rassed in front of other customers. Some web-loggers discussing the
issue online vehemently question those who do not voluntarily show
their receipts as people who have something to hide.77 That reaction is
73. Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Scheckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 215 (1997); Nadler, supra note 6, at 155-56 (reviewing studies and finding
"[p]erceived coercion is determined by the speaker's authority and the speaker's language
working together"); see also Burkoff, supra note 63, at 1119 (noting one survey of Florida
drivers indicated a vast majority of students [90% or more] believed their cars would be
searched regardless of whether they granted consent) (citing Benjamin Cole, Voluntary
Surrender of Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights: A Citizen's View of the 4th Amendment
As It Is Applied to Vehicle Searches (June 1, 2004) (unpublished undergraduate honors in
psychology thesis, Florida State Univ.), available at http://dscholarship.lib.fsu.edu/
undergradl10 (last visited July 18, 2008).
74. Barrio, supra note 73, at 221; Burkoff, supra note 63, at 1121; Nadler, supra note 6,
at 153 ("Law enforcement agencies rely heavily on the consensual encounter technique to
discover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing . . . ."); see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE, 4
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 4 (4th ed. 2004).
75. Burkoff, supra note 63, at 1127-29 (arguing courts treat nonconsensual searches as
consensual, underestimate the coercive impact of authoritative requests, and uphold
consent simply because cases before it have done so); see also Craig M. Bradley, The
Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal Procedure, 76 Miss. L.J. 339, 340 n.5
(2006) ("[Voluntariness is the test of valid consent to search, but ... the Court has never
struck down a consent as involuntary.").
76. John Sabini & Maury Silver, Dispositional vs. Situational Interpretations of
Miligram's Obedience Experiments: "The Fundamental Attributional Error," 13(2) J.
THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 147, 139 (1983).
77. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 2; See Rockstroh, supra note 2 (noting that a call to a
Wal-Mart manager following such an altercation got nowhere because the manager "could
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equally as likely to happen at the store, thus creating real social pres-
sure to consent to the search.78 Another customer may conform simply
because those around him are doing soJ 9 The "follow the leader" syn-
drome tends to make individuals comply, often without conscious
thought.80 "People are especially likely to comply with a request when
it appears that other people like themselves have already done so."'
This reaction is true even when it directly conflicts with a person's own
belief system.8 2 "Consensus equals correctness" has been proven to in-
fluence behaviors from littering at amusement parks, glancing at the
sky, donating blood, or committing suicide.8 3 Thus, here, seeing others
hand over a receipt would create psychological pressure to likewise
comply.
Similarly, those stores that have physical barriers that "herd"
customers through a line and directly to the waiting employee create a
physical pressure to consent to search where the receipt becomes the
not change [Wal-Mart's] corporate policy"); Best Buy: "Sir we need to see your receipt" You:
"Um, no you don't," http://reddit.coninfo/sxly/comments (last visited July 18, 2008);
Receipt Checkers, Google Groups, http://groups.google.com/ (search "Receipt Checkers";
then follow "Receipt Checkers" hyperlink) (last visited July 18, 2008).
78. Id. A second layer to that social pressure is a similar reaction from police who may
eventually be called to further detain the suspected shoplifter. A frequent question asked
by the responding officer is "If you had the receipt the whole time, why not just show it and
avoid all this hassle?" Id.
79. Nadler, supra note 6, at 175 ("We follow the leader, we stop at red lights, and we
comply with the police not because we make a deliberate or conscious choice to respond in a
particular way, but rather because we mindlessly respond in a manner consistent with
social roles."); see also, e.g., Robert J. Wolosin et al., Predictions of Own and Other's
Conformity, 43 J. PERSONALITY 357, 358 (1975) (using subject's estimation of the number of
beeps to show how individuals inherently conform their behavior to those around them).
80. Interestingly, in a work-in-progress group meeting discussing this Article, one of
the first comments was "Why wouldn't a person hand over the receipt? It never occurred to
me not to do so."
81. Nadler, supra note 6, at 180 (citing Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social
Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance, in DANIEL T. GILBERT ET AL., EDS, 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 151, 172 (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed. 1998)).
82. See, e.g., Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 Sci. AM. 31 (1955)
(finding that in a study requesting individuals to compare a series of lines and pick two that
were the same length, when doing so on their own, subjects guessed correctly 98% of the
time, but when other subjects suggested a different answer, the accuracy fell to less than
25%. The results were attributed to conformance to social pressure).
83. Nadler, supra note 6, at 180 (citing Robert Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of
Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in
Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES IN Exp. Soc. PSYCHOL. 201 (1991); Stanley Milgram et al.,
Note on the Drawing Power of Crowds of Different Sizes, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
79 (1969); Peter H. Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a
Request to Donate Money, 9 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 110 (1982); David P. Philips & Laura L.
Cartersen, Clustering of Teenage Suicides After Television Stories About Suicide, 315 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 685 (1986)).
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ticket to leave. Studies have shown that close proximity results in
greater compliance with a demand.8 4 When people feel their personal
space has been violated, their first instinct is often to flee.8 5 In a situa-
tion where customers have been physically herded into a detention
area and demanded to hand over their receipts, they may do so, against
their will, to escape the uncomfortable proximity of the employee. This
theory is supported by several of the accounts where employees at-
tempted to physically restrain those declining customers from leaving.
Furthermore, when the demand is made immediately after the
sale as the customer attempts to leave the store, time pressure may
play a role in quick compliance. Studies have shown that individuals
forced to immediately make a decision may not adequately consider all
possibilities.8 6 Accordingly, customers, particularly those who have
never been confronted with the demand before, might comply simply
because the request is immediate and they have not taken the time to
adequately consider refusal. Each of these detentions, though appear-
ing on their face to be consensual, may be physically, psychologically,
or socially forced. As such, the policy defeats the voluntariness of con-
sent and, thus, may give rise to a false-imprisonment claim.
3. Stop 3: Detention upon Refusal (Right to Refuse?)
Aside from psychological or social coercive pressure to give con-
sent, some store policies go even further and prevent consumers the
84. Nadler, supra note 6, at 191-92 (discussing a 1976 study in which experimenters
made requests for participation from across the room and in close proximity to the subjects.
Those approached within their personal space had a significantly higher acceptance rate);
See Robert A. Baron & Paul A. Bell, Physical Distance and Helping: Some Unexpected
Benefits of"Crowding In" on Others, 6 J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 95 (1976). Other studies have
produced similar results. See, e.g., David B. Buller, Communication, Apprehension, and
Reactions to Proxemic Violations, 11 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 13 (1987) (finding students
asked to sign a petition did so when their personal space was physically invaded); Robert C.
Ernest & Ralph E. Cooper, "Hey Mister, Do You Have Any Change?" Two Real World
Studies of Proxemic Effects on Compliance With a Mundane Request, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 158 (1974) (showing requests for change made on the street were more
successful at close proximity).
85. Nadler, supra note 6, at 191-92 (citing ROBERT SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE: THE
BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF DESIGN 35 (Prentice-Hall, 1969)).
86. Nadler, supra note 6, at 195-96 (citing John W. Payne et al., When Time is Money:
Decision Behavior Under Opportunity-Cost Time Pressure, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 131 (1996); Jose H. Kerstholt, The Effect of Time Pressure on
Decision-Making Behavior in a Dynamic Task Environment, 86 ACTA. PSYCHOLOGICA 89
(1994); Edward M. Bowden, Accessing Relevant Information During Problem Solving: Time
Constraints on Search in the Problem Space, 13 MEMORY & COGNITION 280 (1985); Dan
Zakay & Stuart Wooler, Time Pressure, Training and Decision Effectiveness, 27
ERGONOMICS 273 (1984)).
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opportunity to refuse consent. Many stores physically detain the cus-
tomer until the receipt is handed over. If the customer continues to
refuse, those employees then call the police and turn the shopper over
as a suspected shoplifter. This final detention (often an arrest) resem-
bles the defenses in traditional false-imprisonment claims.
Michael Righi, a popular blogger, gave a personal account of his
arrest following his refusal to show a receipt at a Circuit City store in
Cleveland, Ohio.8 7 Righi described how he purchased two items and
attempted to leave.88 As he approached the exit, a Circuit City em-
ployee tried to stop him and stated, "'Sir, I need to examine your
receipt."'8 9 Righi continued to walk past him and responded, "'No,
thank you."' 90 As Righi explained, "I've always taken the stance that
retail stores shouldn't treat their loyal customers as criminals and that
customers shouldn't so willingly give up their rights along with their
money."9 1 The store employee and the store manager chased Righi
outside the store and demanded that the manager "'needed to examine
[the] bag and receipt before letting [him] leave [the] parking lot.'
92
Righi specifically asked if he was being accused of stealing, and the
manager responded that he was not accusing Righi of anything, but
was "allowed by law" to look through Righi's bag when he left the
store.93 When Righi asked the manager to give him the name of the
law that conferred that right, the manager did not respond. 94 The
manager physically prevented Righi from closing his car door.95 In re-
sponse, Righi himself called the police to request assistance for his
false imprisonment.
96
When the officer arrived on the scene and the situation was ex-
plained, instead of allowing Righi to leave, the officer asked him why
he refused to show his receipt in the first place.97 The officer stated
Circuit City employees did have a right to inspect both receipts and
bags as customers left the store. 98 At that point, the officer demanded
87. Michael Righi, Papers Please: Arrested at Circuit City, September 1, 2007, http:ll














both the receipt and Righi's driver's license. 99 Righi refused, and the
officer placed him under arrest. 10 0 The Circuit City store manager con-
firmed Righi had stolen nothing.101 Righi was eventually charged with
an unrelated obstruction-of-business charge, and those charges were
later dropped. 10
2
The first liability issue in the occurrence is the implicit admis-
sion by the store employees that Righi was not suspected of shoplifting,
the most common basis for detaining a customer. Instead, the employ-
ees stated that they had a right to inspect both the receipt and the bag
simply because Righi was a store customer. Ohio law, however, re-
quired a store employee to have probable cause that a person had
engaged in theft before the store could detain him.'0 3 There may have
been no harm in asking to see the receipt, but the moment Righi re-
fused, the employee had no legal basis to detain him.
More troubling, however, was the subsequent detention by the
police officer. The officer clearly stated that the Circuit City employees
had the right to demand the receipt. While the actions of the store
employees may be dismissed as either following a bad policy or not
clearly understanding the law, official police approval of the detention
without any probable cause to justify the stop compounded the illegal-
ity. Police officers are not guilty of false imprisonment if they
reasonably rely on a storeowner's assertion that theft may have taken
place. 10 4 But when local law enforcement upholds illegal detentions, it
99. Righi, supra note 87.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Michael Righi, Success, http://www.michaelrighi.com/2007/09/ (last visited July 18,
2008). Righi's story, though extreme, is not unique. On Wal-Mart Watch, a watchdog
organization created to monitor Wal-Mart, a customer reported a similar incident. When
the customer refused to stand in line and consent to show his receipt, he was followed to his
car by security, he was accused of stealing items, and his license plate number was recorded
and given to the police. He later was called by the police department, who assured him they
would smooth things over with the store. Wal-Mart Reports You to the Police for Not
Allowing Them to Check Your Receipt, http://walmartwatch.com/blog/archives/walmart-
customerservicenightmaresreceiptcheck (last visited June 24, 2008).
103. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (2003).
104. This Article does not attempt to explore the Fourth or Fifth Amendment
implications of the detention once the police become involved. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tex. 2002) (A store may have civil liability for requesting a
police officer to arrest a suspect, but if the officer is not acting at the direction of the
merchant and makes an arrest based on his own individualized assessment of probable
cause, liability does not transfer to the merchant.); Lusk v. Ira Watson Co., 408 S.E.2d 630,
633 (W. Va. 1991) (Merely giving the on-scene officers factual information about the
encounter is not considered direction or request to arrest.)
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does not cure the underlying illegality.105
Such bootstrapping is impermissible in a criminal context-fail-
ure to give consent to an illegal detention cannot provide justification
for further detention in a criminal case. 10 6 As the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, "[t]he constitutional right to
withdraw one's consent to a search would be of little value if the very
fact of choosing to exercise that right could serve as any part of the
basis for finding the reasonable suspicion that makes consent unneces-
sary."10 7 Similarly, the failure to give consent to search a receipt or a
purchase should not allow businesses to conjure a legitimate basis for
detention in the civil context. The justification for detention is a prod-
uct of the stores' own creative policies and not a valid measure of
actual theft.
B. Implied Consent-Notice of Intent to Search
Some corporations claim that they are not liable for detentions
or searches if they post a notice indicating that they intend to detain
and search.108 Those stores prominently display signs indicating that
receipts must be given and that bags are subject to search. A customer
agrees to such stops and searches when he or she enters the store. A
few jurisdictions have supported the implied-consent theory, which
conditions entry into the store on the customer's consent to search. 0 9
The ability to search rests on two grounds: (1) implied consent to the
105. Scarborough, supra note 4. In at least one instance, the police have actually
encouraged Wal-Mart to adopt the receipt-checking policy. The Arizona Republic reported
that Mesa police had encouraged the corporation to expand its receipt-checking policy to
Mesa stores to reduce the number of theft calls to the police department. While encouraging
the store to request consent searches is probably no different from police departments'
concerted efforts to use consent searches in other areas, the implication of police support
and encouragement is extremely troubling.
106. United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
107. Id. at 1097 (The denial of consent to search is a constitutional right.); See Carey v.
Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
108. Whether Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that free access must be
given to all customers in a public place of accommodation is under debate. See Anne-Marie
G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial
Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 22-23 (2003).
109. U.S. v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding implied consent of
airline passengers to search before boarding airplanes); Zohn v. Menard, Inc., 598 N.W.2d
323, 328-29 (Iowa 1999); Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d 857,860 (Mich. App.
1983); Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). But see Stroeber v.
Comm'n Veteran's Auditorium, 453 F. Supp. 926, 933 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (holding notice of a
consent to search cannot cure constitutional violations).
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posted intent to search, and (2) no reasonable expectation of privacy in
light of the warning.
For the implied-consent cases, the issue becomes adequate no-
tice. The mere posting of a sign is not enough-the corporation must
show that the patron saw the sign to validate the implied consent. 110
Importantly, however, even jurisdictions allowing notice detentions
have held they raise false imprisonment claims in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion of theft."'
Similarly, the reasonable expectation of privacy argument does
not create a blanket rule to search customers just because a sign has
been posted. While courts have recognized that shoppers who are de-
tained for suspected shoplifting or other unlawful behavior do not
automatically have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a store,"
2
those courts have not stated that the absence of privacy expectations
bar a false-imprisonment claim. Rather, the issue is usually whether
the original search was permissible, and if it was, whether it then cre-
ated facts to justify the shoplifting detention. In other words, because
the courts held there was no expectation of privacy in, say, a dressing
room, employees could watch patrons until they witnessed actual theft.
Similarly, if a store, particularly in an area that permits a no-
harm-in-asking policy, asks for a receipt, is given consent, and then
sees that customer was trying to leave with obviously unpaid-for mer-
chandise, it may validly detain the shopper. Moreover, absent
articulated facts of theft, further detention becomes unlawful and,
some courts have rejected the reasonable expectation of privacy argu-
ment altogether. " 3
While the cases above suggest that such strict policies are ille-
gal and do not protect the right to refuse consent, stores continue to
110. Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 329 ("At the very least, the disputed existence of the plaintiffs
failure to notice the signage at the entry of the yard generates a fact question on the implied
consent issue."); see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499 (noting that airline passengers were
warned "PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH").
111. Id. at 329 (holding that regardless of the signage, the detention in the case did not
meet the reasonable suspicion of theft requirement, and thus, violated the statutory
provision granting shopkeeper's license).
112. Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Mich. App. 1983) (holding a
plaintiff had no claim for invasion of privacy when watched in a dressing room because
signs indicated surveillance was in place); Gillett v. State, 588 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1979)
(implicitly holding a customer consented to search when she shoplifted an item in a fitting
room that had been clearly marked as under surveillance); see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at
500 (holding airline passengers had no reasonable expectation of privacy when boarding an
airplane).
113. Stroeber, 453 F. Supp. at 934 (holding mere notice of intent to search does not cure
constitutional violations).
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rely on receipt-checking policies and prior notice of such policies by
claiming shopkeeper's license as a bar to any potential liability.
IV. IMPROPER RELIANCE ON SHOPKEEPER'S LICENSE
Most states have recognized a detention that is lawfully exer-
cised under the "shopkeeper's license" as a bar to litigation. Unlike
consent, which defeats an element of the plaintiffs case, the shop-
keeper's license is an affirmative defense to false imprisonment. These
laws are often known as "shield laws" for they shield the merchant
from civil liability, provided the merchant meets the minimum thresh-
old for detaining the suspected shoplifter. 114 Under this shopkeeper's
license exception, a merchant who has a reason to believe a person has
committed or is committing a theft may detain that person to investi-
gate the supposed theft." 5 The Second Restatement of Torts states:
One who reasonably believes that another has tortiously taken a
chattel upon his premises, or has failed to make due cash payment
for a chattel purchased or services rendered there, is privileged,
without arresting the other, to detain him on the premises for the
time necessary for a reasonable investigation of the facts.
116
Notably, while the Second Restatement authorizes detention, it ad-
dresses only the reasonableness of the belief by the shopkeeper and not
the legal standard that justifies the detention. Some jurisdictions have
interpreted "reasonable" to mean reasonable suspicion of theft.
117
114. Bishop, supra note 25, at 56.
115. See Rankin v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 814, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
2002). The license to detain applies not only to individuals who are suspected of theft, but
also individuals in the company of the suspected shoplifter who may be guilty of assisting;
and Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 595 P.2d 975, 981-82 (Cal. 1979).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A at 202 (1965).
117. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1805 (2007) (reasonable cause of shoplifting); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-36-116 (West 2009) (reasonable cause to believe shoplifting has occurred); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-7-60 (West 1958) (reasonable belief of shoplifting); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-2 (2005)
(reasonable grounds of larceny); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808.12 (West 1978) (reasonable grounds
of property concealment): 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/16A-5 (West 2000) (reasonable grounds
of retail theft); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. § 215 (2003) (reasonable grounds to believe
theft occurred); MAsS. GEN LAWS ch. 231, § 94B (West 2000) (reasonable grounds to believe
larceny occurred); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.366 (2003) (reasonable cause to believe theft
occurred); Mo. ANN. STAT, § 537.125. (2000) (reasonable cause of wrongful taking of
property); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-506 (1993) (reason to believe theft has occurred); NEv.
REV. STAT. § 597.850 (2003) (reason to believe shoplifting has occurred); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 627:8 (1973) (reasonable belief of unlawful taking); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 218 (2004)
(reasonable grounds); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-21-034 (1975) (reasonably belief of theft); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1343 (1967) (reasonable grounds or probable cause depending on the
facts of the case); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-140 (1976) (reasonable cause to believe shoplifting
occurred); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-30A-19.2 (2005) (reasonable grounds of shoplifting);
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Others have raised the bar to require the same minimum finding as a
lawful arrest-probable cause. 118 Finally, a small minority have set a
requirement of actual knowledge of theft. 119 The waters are muddied,
however, when the statutory provision requires actual knowledge,
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, and then case law indicates
there is no significant difference between any of the standards. 120
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 124.001 (2005) (reasonably believes property has been
stolen); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2576 (1977) (reasonable cause to believe retail theft has
been committed); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.220 (West 1988) (reasonable grounds of
shoplifting or larceny); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4 (West 1981) (reasonable ground to
believe shoplifting has occurred); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.50 (West 2005) (reasonable cause of
retail theft);
118. ALA. CODE § 15-10-14 (1957) (requiring probable cause that goods have been
unlawfully taken); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.230 (1978); CAL. PENAL. CODE § 490.5 (West 1999)
(probable cause needed to detain); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-407 (West 2004) (probable
cause needed to detain a person suspected of theft); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §840 (1999)
(requiring probable cause that suspect has intentionally concealed unpurchased
merchandise); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3213 (1982) (probable cause needed at time of arrest or
detainment); FLA. STAT. § 812.015 (West 2007) (probable cause required to detain); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-4626 (2005) (probable cause required to detain suspected shoplifter); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-33-6-2 (West 2004) (requiring probable cause that theft occurred); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §21-3424 (1995) (requiring probable cause that suspect has wrongfully taken
merchandise); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433.236 (West 2007) (probable cause required to detain
suspect when officer believes goods have been unlawfully taken); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17
§ 3521 (2005) (requiring probable cause that suspect has unlawfully concealed
merchandise); MD. CODE ANN., [CTs. & JUD. PROC.] § 5-402 (West 1997) (requiring probable
cause that person committed crime of theft); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2917 (1992)
(requiring probable cause to believe larceny has been committed); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-
95 (1988) (probable cause needed to stop a person suspected of shoplifting); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.125 (2000) (requiring probable cause that merchandise has been wrongfully taken);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402.01 (1963) (probable cause needed to show merchandise was
unlawfully taken); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-11 (West 2006) (requiring probable cause that a
person willfully concealed unpurchased merchandise); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-23 (West
1965) (requiring probable cause that a person has willfully taken merchandise without
paying); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-72.1 (West 1997) (requiring probable cause showing
merchandise was concealed); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.041 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 131.655 (West 2005) (probable cause that person has committed theft); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. § 3929 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-116 (West 1990) (probable cause that a person
has committed theft); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-603 (West 1979); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-105.1
(West 1976) (requiring probable cause that a person has shoplifted).
119. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-119a (West 2007) (actual knowledge); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-41-21 (1985) (observes).
120. See, e.g., Josey v. Filene's, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding the
actual-knowledge statutory requirement is satisfied if the merchant reasonably suspects a
customer is stealing); Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 585 (Alaska 1973) (stating a
stop was justified under the probable cause requirement when the shopkeeper had
reasonable cause to detain); Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 680 P.2d 807, 813 (Ariz.
1984) ("'[R]easonable cause' and 'probable cause' are equivalent."); Henry v. Shopper's
World, 490 A.2d 320, 322 (N.J. Super. 1985) (holding that a security guard who had
reasonable cause to believe a coat had been stolen met the probable cause standard because
he did not act unreasonably); State v. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d 173, 181 (OhioApp. 1975)
(noting that the standard is probable or reasonable cause); Brown v. SCOA Indus., Inc., 741
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Most shopkeeper's-license privileges are statutory and reflect a
policy of allowing merchants to protect their property immediately
rather than wait for authorities to verify suspicions. The right to de-
tain the suspected thief arises from the common-law right to conduct a
citizen's arrest. 121 The common law recognized that citizens were ca-
pable of performing arrests because they were equally as capable as
law enforcement of recognizing probable cause. 122 Importantly, most
jurisdictions do not require that the merchant or its employees actually
witness a theft. 23 Instead, the facts need merely create the probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.' 24 Gener-
ally, the merchant has the burden to prove that probable cause or
reasonable suspicion has been satisfied.125
Furthermore, while merchants are entitled to make the deten-
tion if they have formed a belief that shoplifting has taken place, their
rights are limited in duration and manner: the detention must be in a
reasonable manner and only for a reasonable period of time.' 26 Once
again, the nature of the detention may give rise to a false imprison-
ment claim even where the initial detention did not.
The first standard, probable cause, is a fluid concept based on
the totality of the circumstances. 27 Merchants in those jurisdictions
that require probable cause must prove it was more likely than not the
suspected thief was engaged in shoplifting. 128 In contrast, the more
common standard, reasonable grounds, means something less than
probable cause. 129 But regardless of the articulated standard, the crux
S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tenn. App. 1987) (holding that an employee who had a reasonable basis to
believe a theft had taken place satisfied the probable cause standard); Moore v. Pay'N Save
Corp., 581 P.2d 159, 164 (Wash. App. 1978) (noting that satisfying reasonable grounds
required a determination of whether probable cause that a theft had taken place existed).
121. Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6 P.3d 583, 591 (Wash. App. 2000).
122. Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 680 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1984) (summarizing the
bases for citizen's arrests).
123. Bishop, supra note 25, at 56.
124. Supra notes 117-18.
125. See, e.g., Frison v. Delchamps Store No. 11, 507 So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala. 1987) (noting
that the question of whether probable cause existed should go to a jury); Consol. Sales Co. v.
Malone, 530 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1975). But see, e.g., Moore v. Target Stores, Inc., 571 P.2d
1236, 1239 (Okla. App. 1977) (holding the burden was on the customer to show by
affirmative evidence that reasonable ground or probable cause did not exist).
126. Walters v. J.C. Penny Co., 82 P.3d 578, 584-85 (Okla. 2003); Dillard Dept. Stores,
Inc. v. Silva, 106 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). At least one state, New Jersey, has
held that it is the customer's burden to prove that the detention was for an unreasonable
manner of time. Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 232 A.2d 425, 429 (N.J. Super. 1967).
127. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
128. Bostic v. City of Chicago, 981 F.2d 965, 968-69 (7th Cir. 1992).
129. Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 525 So. 2d 111, 114 (La. App. 1988).
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of the shopkeeper's license privilege is that the belief is reasonable,
and a merchant can only prove reasonableness when there are facts to
support the suspicion. 130 Those facts do not need to rise to the level of
actual knowledge-many states have turned to the reasonable belief
language for the purpose of allowing shopkeeper inferences of theft.' 3 '
Nonetheless, those inferences must still be based on clearly articulated
facts.' 32 Such facts may include wearing garments with tags still at-
tached, 33 setting off security sensors, 3 4 leaving the store without
paying for merchandise, 135 and attempting to return merchandise
picked up in the store. 136 Absent these types of specific facts, however,
shopkeepers cannot meet their burden of proof to invoke the shield.1
37
As a general rule, the mere fact that a store has a history of
shoplifting theft does not create probable cause for any one individ-
ual.138 The facts must indicate that particular suspect is likely to be
130. See, e.g., Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973) (noting that
evidence must establish that suspect's conduct as observed through its employees gave
shopkeeper reasonable belief that suspect concealed merchandise that was not paid for).
131. See, e.g., Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 680 P.2d 807, 813 (Ariz. 1984)
("[R]easonable cause clause was inserted in this section generally to cover those situations
where no one actually saw the theft.").
.132. Id.; see also Street v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 (Ind. App. 1996)
("[F acts found on reasonable inquiry would induce reasonably intelligent prudent person to
believe that the accused has committed a crime."); Wilson, 525 So. 2d at 114.
133. Henry's v. Shopper's World, 490 A.2d 320, 322 (N.J. Super. 1985) (holding that
merchant had probable cause for detaining plaintiff when tag of clothing was attached to
the garment plaintiff was wearing).
134. Johnson v. Lord & Taylor, 807 N.Y.S.2d 367, 367-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding
that sensor alarm sounding when plaintiff exited the store gave the security guard a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to detain).
135. Karkut v. Target Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879-80 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that
employees had probable cause to detain when suspect left the store without paying for
merchandise).
136. Brown v. SCOA Indus., Inc., 741 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that
reasonable basis existed to believe minor had stolen cassette tape).
137. J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 148 So. 2d 679, 684 (Miss. 1963) ("The investigation should
be based on more than mere conjecture or suspicion. It must be grounded on some definite
information from some person that saw enough to justify [shopkeeper's belief] that a person
was guilty of shoplifting."); Mullins v. Friend, 449 S.E.2d 227, 231-32 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a clerk who heard a customer rustling paper but did not see illegal action did
not meet the probable cause standard in the statute and, thus, could, not invoke the
protection); State v. McDaniel, 337 N.E.2d 173, 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) ("[Wiholesale
observation of customers by invading their privacy cannot be justified, nor can such
observation be properly predicated upon mere suspicion or hunch."); see also Jones v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 459 F. 2d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding even a suspicion the consumer
did not pay the appropriate price did not justify invoking a shopkeeper's privilege statute
once the "sales slip had been rendered and paid for").
138. Pinkett v. Super Fresh Foods Mkts, Inc., Civ. A. No. 87-4573, 1988 WL 30952, at 6*
(E.D. Penn. 1988); Gonzales v. Harris, 542 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo. 1975) (holding that presence
of probable cause is a question of fact).
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stealing, not just that something is missing and anyone in the store
could have taken the item.139 The belief must relate directly to the
individual detained, and shopkeepers cannot cast a wide net over all
customers in the hope of catching one guilty party. Similarly, stores
cannot point to mere profiling, or statements that the plaintiff "looked
like a thief' as the basis for invoking the privilege. 140 The typical char-
acteristics of a shoplifter tend to vary drastically.14 ' Thus, without
particularized facts to reasonably justify a stop, systematic detention
of most or all customers may implicate false imprisonment. Because
receipt-checking is not related to any fact of theft other than presence
in the store, detention for failure to give consent does not create an
adequate basis for invoking the privilege.
Before 1936, shopkeepers who invoked the privilege against an
innocent person were barred from using the license as a shield. 142 The
purpose of the rule was to force shopkeepers to make their detention
decisions carefully and only detain those who truly raised suspicion of
possible theft. If such a rule or presumption were in place today, re-
ceipt-checking policies would give rise to tremendous litigation risks
because a vast majority of detained customers produce a valid receipt.
In part, to balance the interest between theft prevention and intrusion
on personal rights, the shopkeeper's license reasonableness standard
arose. Articulating facts to support probable cause or reasonable sus-
picion of theft ensures that unlawful detentions will be minimized, and
reasonable mistakes about theft will be forgiven; however, the test re-
quires individualized analysis of the situation on a case-by-case
basis-something a receipt-checking policy does not provide. As such,
139.. Crase v. Highland Village Value Plus Pharmacy, 374 N.E.2d 58, 62 (Ind. App.
1978) ("[P]rotection of the Act was not extended unless there was probable cause to believe
both that a theft occurred or was occurring on or about the mercantile establishment and
that a specific person had committed or was committing the theft.").
140. Mullins, 449 S.E.2d at 232 (rejecting the security personnel's statement that, based
on her experience, the plaintiff met the profile of a shoplifter and thus, established probable
cause. Without the probable cause, the actions were not protected, even though the court
deemed them reasonable).
141. Bishop, supra note 25, at 44-45 (citing Pyatt, Shoplifting Stereotypes, WASH. POST,
Sept. 30, 1986 at C1, col 1.). Bishop points out that the typical shoplifter is "as likely to be a
grandmother as a drug addict, a deacon in the church as a hardened criminal." In fact, most
people arrested for shoplifting have no prior criminal record and also have a means of
payment with them at the time of the arrest. Id. at 45. Additionally, racial profiling simply
does not guarantee a decreased likelihood of loss prevention.
142. Bishop, supra note 25, at 67-68 (citing Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So. 2d 990, 991 (Ala.
1985)). Even as late as 1985, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a person exonerated
may file a claim for false imprisonment and that the reasonableness of the detainer's belief
did not justify trespass.
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reliance on the privilege to justify receipt-checking detentions is
inappropriate.
V. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH BROAD ANTI-THEFT POLICIES
One commentator noted that while "retail trade journals are re-
plete with articles about shoplifting security and shoplifting
statistics[,] ... [n]oticeably absent... is any detailed discussion of the
legal aspects of the shoplifting problem." 143 The cost of this lack of
knowledge can be significant. Civil suits, including false imprisonment
claims, filed by individuals wrongfully accused of shoplifting often
have large jury verdicts. 144 Besides the costs of the verdicts, compa-
nies have to bear the cost of repeated litigation.
Another dangerous side effect of a receipt-checking policy is the
potential for abuse by employees, effectively opening the store to re-
spondeat superior claims. Some of the accounts related to receipt-
checking show a disconnect between the actual store policy and its im-
plementation. For example, when one Wal-Mart shopper was stopped
and accused of stealing a bag full of merchandise when he refused to
stand in line and allow the door greeter to search his bag, as the
greeter was doing to all other patrons, he was later told by manage-
ment that the actual policy only required a receipt check for unbagged
items. 145 The employee either did not understand the policy, or the
employee took the opportunity to exert unnecessary authority over the
customers.
While receipt-checking on its face violates the law, the process
may also open the door for further abuse. Consumer racial profiling, or
CRP, 146 is often unquantifiable, subtle, and unchecked. 47 A policy al-
lowing gatekeeper employees to stop and demand receipts is an ideal
tool to violate the rights of minority customers. 148 Even without corpo-
143. Bishop, supra note 25, at 45.
144. Id.
145. Wal-Mart Reports You to the Police for Not Allowing Them to Check Your Receipt,
http://walmartwatch.com/blogarchives/wal-mart-customer-service-nightmares-receipL
check (last visited March 15, 2009).
146. Harris, supra note 108, at 1; see also Joe R. Feagan, The Continuing Significance of
Race: Anti-black Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 101, 111-12 (1991);
Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights
Protection, 66 Mo. L. REV. 275, 299 (2001); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1286-88 (1996).
147. Harris, supra note 108, at 5.
148. Kennedy, supra note 146, at 304. The company itself may have CRP as a stated or
unstated portion of its receipt policy. For example, in a large retail chain, stores in lower-
income neighborhoods or in areas with high percentages of particular ethnic groups might
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rate endorsement, allowing individual employees to enforce receipt-
checking policies creates large potential for abuse. 149 While social
pressures often encourage minority consumers not to seek redress for
such discrimination 15 0 because they feel a need to prove to white em-
ployees they are entitled to be shopping there,1 51  employee
discrimination is still a legitimate litigation risk related to these poli-
cies. Gatekeeper employees who do not realize they are profiling
certain groups may escalate a simple receipt request into an unlawful
detention for a minority customer who may not have happened with a
white customer.
152
Likewise, groups of people, such as non-English speakers and
underage, elderly, or disabled persons, may become victims of unlawful
detentions because they do not understand the request at the outset.
Their inadvertent failure to give consent because of a language or un-
derstanding barrier, rather than proof of theft, may escalate to an
unlawful detention as well.
have more rigid receipt-checking policies than stores in more affluent areas. Or, stores may
direct their employees to check the receipts of only those people fitting a particular racial
profile. Others may simply "quietly acquiesce in the treatment of blacks as unworthy
shoppers."
149. See Kennedy, supra note 146, at 280 (noting "security guards, armed with
assumptions about links among race, gender, age, and criminality, frequently feel justified
in separating out African American shoppers for differential treatment"); see also JOE R.
FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 21,
41 (Beacon 1994) ("Another problem that black shoppers face, . . . is the common white
assumption that they are likely shoplifters.");
150. See Claudine Columbres, Targeting Retail Discrimination with Parens Patriae, 36
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 209, 210-211 (2003); Harris, supra note 108, at 46-50; Kennedy,
supra note 146, at 278-79 (noting that § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not include
retail stores on its enumerated list of places of accommodation); Kennedy, supra note 146, at
326-27; Loren Page Ambinder, Note, Dispelling the Myth of Rationality: Racial
Discrimination in Taxicab Service and the Efficacy of Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 342, 364 (1996).
151. Harris, supra note 108, at 11-12:
Most blacks compensate by proving themselves worthy shoppers.... They dress up
to go shopping in the hope that their appearance will convey the fact that they are
both entitled to browse and capable of paying for any item that they put their hands
on. Some folks flash their credit cards or engage the salesperson in conversation
designed to reveal the shopper's class position or sophistication regarding the
product. Others will buy expensive goods they do not really want just prove that
they have been misjudged by a salesclerk.
Providing evidence of an actual purchase during a receipt check is a perfect opportunity
to show-up that questioning employee.
152. Commentators recognize that some CPR is based on subconscious racism. Harris,
supra note 108, at 10 ("Unwittingly, some retailers make assumptions about their black
customers based on stereotypes relating to the propensity of African Americans to commit
crimes and their inability to pay for goods.").
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that
loss prevention employees have a special duty to customers stemming
from their authority to detain. 15 3 This duty involves an exercise of the
utmost care. Accordingly, the stores themselves may be liable for neg-
ligent training merely because it is foreseeable that a loss-prevention
employee could harm a customer in the course of his job. 154 Failure to
provide that training is the store's breach of its duty to consumers. 155
Finally, and most pragmatically, retailers run a high risk of
alienating their customers by using aggressive anti-theft tactics. The
impact of a forced detention and search is not limited to annoyance or
indignation. One commentator noted that the vast majority of individ-
uals surveyed after they had given consent to a search often felt very
negatively about the encounter. 156 In light of the numbers of people
who consent to search, the issue should not be ignored. Personal resis-
tance to the store policy and secondhand information about successful
lawsuits against the policies hurt business. "A countersuit, if success-
ful, can do more damage to a business than a battalion of
shoplifters."l 57 The media coverage and word of mouth can damage a
business's reputation beyond repair, but the more immediate response
of the stop-and-search policy is the loss of that particular customer who
is turned off by the practice.
The outcry against receipt-checking policies is overwhelming-
customers express disgust, hurt, offense, and embarrassment at im-
plicitly being accused of theft. Many refuse to adhere to the policy out
of spite, and some refuse to return to stores simply because such poli-
cies are implemented there. Michael Righi's blog generated $5,197.23
dollars in donated legal fees during a seventeen-day period. 158 A
search on the internet concerning the receipt issue generated over half-
a-million hits. In an age of dwindling attention to customer service,
another store policy created only to preserve the bottom line may end
up creating the opposite effect.
Perhaps the easiest solution, a solution followed by some stores,
is to abandon the receipt-checking policy and rely only on electronic
sensors. New York courts have recognized that reasonable suspicion
153. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Wis. 1998).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Nadler, supra note 6, at 211-13.
157. Miller, 580 N.W.2d at 238.
158. Michael Righi, Success, July 18, 2008, http://www.michaelrighi.com/2007/09/.
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arising from an electronic sensor alarm is a valid basis for detention. 159
West Virginia even codified the protection when it relates to electronic
sensors. 1
60
In reality, many stores will ignore the litigation and customer-
loss risks for the purpose of using the policies to stop employee theft.
Checking receipts is a good way to tell if employees have given mer-
chandise to a customer without ringing it up or pricing it at a grossly
reduced amount. In fact, that may be the very reason the policies were
created in the first place-to capture employee, not customer, theft.
Because employee theft grossly outweighs consumer theft, big-box
stores may consider customer alienation and false imprisonment litiga-
tion an acceptable cost of stopping an internal problem. The issue is
whether tort law has the power to curb the unlawful practice if the
store chooses to continue it.
VI. POWER OF BIG-BOX STORES: THE WAL-MART CASE STUDY
It has been argued that a corporation's "only social responsibil-
ity is to increase its profits."161 Under this logic, corporations have no
social responsibility to their employees, consumers, or other people
they tangentially affect. Yet in a world where consumer consumption
has literally exploded, the power of the retail industry to effect social
change is unprecedented. In his book, The Wal-Mart Effect, Charles
Fishman documents many of the numerous effects Wal-Mart has on
the retail industry, our environment, our daily behavior, the global
economy, and even our way of thought. 162 This sort of impact raises
the question of what kind of checks and balances truly reign in a corpo-
ration with unprecedented power? Using Wal-Mart and receipt-
checking policies as an example, the likely answer is that absent its
own self-restraint, only consumer pressure, not the law, has the power
to stop unlawful corporate behavior. 163 According to the analysis
159. Johnson v. Lord & Taylor, 807 N.Y.S.2d 367, 367-68 (N.J. 2006) ("[Dletention had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis, the sensor's sounding."); see also Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai
Med. Ctr., 588 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ohio App. 1990).
160. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4a (West 2000) ("The activation of an anti-shoplifting or
inventory control device as a result of a person exiting the establishment or a protected area
within the establishment shall constitute reasonable cause.").
161. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at xvii (quoting corporate apologist Milton Freidman).
162. FISHMAN, supra note 31.
163. David Neumark et al., The Effects of Wal-Mart on Local Labor Markets 1 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11782, 2005) (Wal-Mart is the "largest
corporation in the world, with total revenues of $285 billion in 2005."); Thomas A. Hemphill,
Rejuvenating Wal-Mart's Reputation, 48 BUSINESS HORIZONS 11, 11 (2005). Wal-Mart alone
accounts for 8% of total retail sales in the United States, and over 140 million shoppers visit
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above, detention of a customer for failure to show a receipt violates the
law. Yet these policies are used throughout the nation with support
from local law enforcement. The law is a reflection of society's morals,
rules, and values. 164 Thus, as peoples' patterns of living change, the
law follows. But when corporations flout the law, if the law has no
power to curb the behavior, the reverse happens-the law yields to the
interest of the company at the expense of the individual.
Many commentators have noted the tremendous economic
power of a store like Wal-Mart. In terms of social costs, being the
world's largest corporation allows it to change the very way we live our
lives. 16 5 The powers of Wal-Mart are many: First, it is well docu-
mented that its entry into a market drives numerous competitors,
particularly local smaller stores, out of business. 166 In fact, local
merchants were the source of the first grassroots anti-Wal-Mart move-
ments in the early 1980s. 167 "In the same decade that Wal-Mart has
come to dominate the grocery business in the United States, thirty-one
supermarket chains have sought bankruptcy protection; twenty-seven
of them cite competition from Wal-Mart as a factor." 68 Empirical
studies have noted the negative impact the homogenous store has on
small town life, local profitability, consumer variety, and community
growth.' 69 Its economic power dictates which competitors will survive.
Wal-Mart each week. It employs 1.2 million people in the United States. Id. at 12. It "is
the leading employer of minorities in the U.S." Id. at 13. It is also the largest grocery chain
in the U.S., capturing 15% of the market share. Id. at 15. Needless to say, Wal-Mart as an
economic power is undeniable.
164. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition
of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2005) ("[The law] secures public order
and protects against violence .... It promotes the achievement of collective moral goals
165. See Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24
J.L. & COM. 1, 36 (2004) ("When Wal-Mart establishes a retail outlet, detrimental
community effects can be expected. These effects include decreased community
involvement, decreased community building efforts, decreased small business, decreased
labor opportunities, and increased commercial vacancies.").
166. Hemphill, supra note 160, at 13 ("[Flor every new Supercenter Wal-Mart opens,
two supermarkets ... close."). One study in Los Angeles concluded the "arrival of big-box
stores would result in a net loss of jobs and force other businesses to lower wages and/or
reduce benefits." Id. at 15.
167. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 167 ("It was the small business owners on town squares
and main streets . . . who were the first to quail at the menace from the big box full of
bargains."); see id. at 167-87 for a fuller discussion of the first anti-Wal-Mart campaigns.
168. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 4; Patricia Callahan & Ann Zimmerman, Wal-Mart
Tops Grocery List with its Supercenter Format, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2003, at B1.
169. See, e.g., Emek Basker, Selling a Cheaper Mousetrap: Wal-Mart's Effect on Retail
Prices, 58 J. URBAN ECON. 203 (2005); Kenneth E. Stone, Impact of the Wal-Mart
Phenomenon on Rural Communities, Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and
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Second, Wal-Mart shapes the entire retail industry by forcing
product manufacturers to change products and pricing to Wal-Mart's
specifications. 170 It controls product size (to fit on its shelves), dictates
manufacturing scheduling, demands conformance to its internal
processing programs (UPC codes), and, most importantly, dictates
price, always at the manufacturer's cost.' 7 ' These demands, in turn,
influence the global community by driving manufacturing and employ-
ment opportunities out of the United States to countries where labor is
less expensive.' 7 2 It directly and indirectly lowers prices of consumer
goods in each new market it enters. 173 In fact, Wal-Mart has been
credited with keeping the country's inflation rate down. 174 But those
declining consumer prices come at a cost. Manufacturers, forced to
comply with the lower prices, often move their facilities to overseas
markets with cheaper labor. 175 That labor is often exploited, with ac-
Policies, FARM FOUND. (1997), available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/stone/;
Kenneth E. Stone, The Effect of Wal-Mart Stores on Businesses in Host Towns and
Surrounding Towns in Iowa, Nov. 9, 1988, available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/
stone/ (the first major study to chart the negative impact Wal-Mart had on a state's retail
industry); see also FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 140-144, 153-156; VanderVelde, supra note 8,
at 18-19. A few commentators disagree. See, e.g., Steven Malanga, What Does War on Wal-
Mart Mean?, CITY J., Spring 2004, available at http://www.city-journal.org/printable.php?
id=1333 (arguing the "reactionary unions and their allies" are ignoring the greater benefit of
increased jobs and decreased prices).
170. Hemphill, supra note 163, at 16 ("For Wal-Mart, price is the primary driver of its
successful consumer business operations: consequently, reducing production costs is the
mantra with which Wal-Mart's 21,000 suppliers are confronted: take-it-or-leave-it.");
Sheehy, supra note 165, at 36 ("Wal-Mart requires it suppliers to drop prices annually by as
much as 5%..., drivi[ing] suppliers out of business .... [and causing them] to cannibalize
[them] sel [ves].").
171. Sheehy, supra note 165, at 36-37.
172. Hemphill, supra note 160, at 16 ("Wal-Mart critics point to the retailer's global
pursuit of lower-cost goods as contributing to the accelerating loss of U.S. manufacturing
jobs to China and other low-wage paying countries in Southeast Asia.").
173. Basker, supra note 166, at 28 (finding that Wal-Mart's effect on driving prices
down is "economically large-1.5-3% in the short run, and four times as much in the long
run-and is statistically significant"); Jerry Hausman & Ephraim Leibtag, Consumer
Benefits from Increased Competition in Shopping Outlets: Measuring the Effect of Wal-Mart
2-6, 29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11809, 2005) ("Wal-Mart's
entry into a new geographic market creates a direct price effect by offering a lower price
option to consumers and an indirect price effect by causing traditional supermarkets to
lower their prices because of increased competition.").
174. Ellen Israel Rosen, The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade Organization and the
Race to the Bottom, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 261, 262 (2005); Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is
Wal-Mart too Powerful?, BusINESSWEEK, Oct. 5, 2003, at 101.
175. Sheehy, supra note 165, at 43; see also FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 106 (noting that
Wal-Mart's use of foreign cheap labor is inevitable given its push for lower and lower
prices); Rosen, supra note 174, at 261 ("Wal-Mart's method of conducting business is not
good for America, nor is it good for developing nations. Rather, it is likely that Wal-Mart's
trade choices will actually lead to further extremes of wealth and poverty wherever the
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counts of forced slave labor and child labor playing most often in the
press. 1
76
Third, Wal-Mart directly changes the local retail labor market
by reducing jobs and lowering the standard wage for all retail employ-
ees. 177 Competitors are forced to lower their employee wages and
benefits to cover the loss of profits associated with Wal-Mart's price
decreases. 178 Additionally, the push-down of labor standards influ-
ences the poverty rate. At least one study found that communities
with Wal-Mart stores have seen greater increase (or slower and
smaller decreases) of the poverty rate than communities without a
Wal-Mart store.' 79
Finally, Wal-Mart even grossly changes traffic patterns and en-
vironmental quality in new store locations. 8 0 It is changing the entire
environmental landscape of many of its supplier countries.' 8 ' These
local impacts are aside from the massive environmental resources de-
voted each year to packaging and transporting billions of dollars worth
of consumer goods around the globe. In light of these impacts, does it
company does business."); see also id. at 265 (The World Trade Organization's elimination
of quotas will further encourage companies seeking lower prices to move to countries that
can produce greater volume for less money.).
176. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 223-29, 318-45 (discussing Wal-Mart executive David
Glass's disastrous interview with Dateline NBC where he was first confronted publicly with
findings of human rights organizations that Wal-Mart exploited child, prison, and slave
labor, and Kathie Lee Gifford's traumatic realization that her clothing line, supplied for
Wal-Mart, used the same).
177. Neumark, supra note 163, at 28 (using a comprehensive empirical analysis to
conclude that the opening of a new Wal-Mart store "reduce[s] retail employment by [an
average] of 2.7 percent" and "retail earnings at the county level" by 1.5%).
178. Rosen, supra 174, at 278. Wal-Mart's employment practices not only affect the
surrounding market, they are changing internally as well. For a full account of the shift
from Sam Walton's "associate as partner" philosophy to an emphasis on the bottom line and
viewing employees as another operating cost, see Irma Mathis, Transforming
Organizational Culture: The Case of Wal-Mart (Dec. 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
University of Texas at San Antonio) (on file with author).
179. Stephan J. Goetz & Hema Swaminathan, Wal-Mart and County-Wide Poverty 12
(Dept. Agricultural Econ. & Rural Sociology, Penn State University, AERS Staff Paper No.
371, 2004).
180. Hemphill, supra note 160, at 15 (citing AL NORMAN, SLAM DUNKING WAL-MART
(Norman 1999)). ("The National Trust for Historic Preservation placed Vermont on its list
of the 10 most endangered places in 2004, warning that the state's small-town charm is
threatened by Wal-Mart."). Environmental and land use issues accompanying a Wal-Mart
store include changed air quality, threat to water quality, reduction of wildlife habitat, loss
of open space, overdependence on automobiles, and deterioration of historic commercial
centers.
181. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 171. One good example is the negative environmental
impact on Chile caused by its new role as salmon supplier for Wal-Mart. Because it is a
developing country without sophisticated environmental protections or technology, its new
salmon industry is polluting the land oceans significantly. Id. at 177-78.
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also have the power to overcome the law through policy alone? Consid-
ering three areas in which Wal-Mart power has remained unchecked-
impacts on state and federal spending programs, controlling consumer
behavior, and ignoring the law in other contexts-the answer is proba-
bly "yes."
First, Wal-Mart's internal employment policies have a substan-
tial impact on social services, such as state and federal health
programs.' 8 2 One study investigating Wal-Mart's affect on Medicaid
expenditures noted that the corporation's presence in a region caused
Medicaid expenditures to go up.18 3 Another study estimated that Wal-
Mart caused California's taxpayers more than $86 million a year to
supplement the corporation's low wages and benefits.' 8 4 In Georgia,
10,261 children in the state funded medical system had a parent work-
ing at Wal-Mart, compared with only 734 children in the next-highest
represented company.' 8 5 These statistics show that taxpayers become
an "indirect public subsidy" bearing the cost of Wal-Mart's labor
force.18 6 The New York Times uncovered an internal memo written by
the executive vice-president of benefits to the Wal-Mart board of direc-
tors admitting that Wal-Mart "'critics are correct in some of their
observations. Specifically, our coverage is expensive for low income
families, and Wal-Mart has a significant percentage of associates and
children on public assistance."'18 7 The memo acknowledged that 46%
of employee children were either uninsured or on Medicaid, and 5% of
all Wal-Mart employees relied on Medicaid, compared to only 4% for
182. Hemphill, supra note 163, at 13. Only 70% of Wal-Mart's employees qualify for
health benefits, and only 38% of those eligible use it. "Wal-Mart spends 30% less per
employee on healthcare than its competitors." It "does not cover flu shots, child
vaccinations, or contraceptives." And, "new full-time employees wait for 6 months to be
eligible for its health care plan and the company does not cover any health care benefits for
retirees." The net result of this healthcare gap means Wal-Mart costs are subsidized by
state and community social services.
183. Michael J. Hicks, Does Wal-Mart Cause an Increase in Anti-Poverty Program
Expenditures?, 2005 CTR. LABOR RES. & EDUC. 18, available at http://www.globalinsight.
comlpublicDownload/genericContent/hicks-poverty.pdf (Hicks hedges that other factors
such as "bad poverty amelioration or labor market policy" may influence these results. Wal-
Mart's own internal, memorandum, however, gives credence to the company's use of social
services as a supplement to paying its employees adequate benefits.).
184. Arindrajit Dube & Ken Jacobs, Hidden Cost of Wal-Mart Jobs, BERKLEY LABOR
CTR., at 8 (2005); Carol Zabin et al., The Hidden Public Costs of Low-Wage Jobs in
California, THE NAT'L ECON DEVEL. & L. CTR., at 23-24 (2004).
185. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 240.
186. Dube, supra note 184, at 8 ("Some Wal-Mart stores encourage employees to seek
state assistance to subsidize the low incomes Wal-Mart pays."); Sheehy, supra note 162, at
39 n.171 (citing Barbara Ehrenreich, Wal-MartInvades Earth, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004).
187. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to Cut
Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 1728937.
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other employers.' 88 Yet despite this obvious reliance on state and fed-
eral programs to subsidize Wal-Mart and increase company profits, the
point of the memo was how to further reduce employee benefits and cut
the costs of employment, including "discouraging unhealthy people
from working at Wal-Mart" and voicing concern that more senior work-
ers cost more in wages and benefits but did not increase
productivity.' 8 9 Wal-Mart has the power to make taxpayers foot the
bill for its inadequate healthcare coverage, with nothing seeming to
prevent it from doing so.
Second, it changes the way consumers act. Wal-Mart has the
power to change general consumer behavior. In his book, The Wal-
Mart Effect, Charles Fishman notes that the store has changed the
way we think about shopping, from influencing our notions about qual-
ity, to resetting our expectations about pricing.' 90 It dictates what we
buy in multiple ways. It limits our choices so that we purchase what is
supplied through the store.' 9 ' It even tricks us into believing we need
certain products. One anecdote involved Wal-Mart's manipulation of
the pickle market. 92 To prove its low prices, Wal-Mart forced one of
its high-quality pickle manufacturers to supply a super-sized jar of
pickles for less than $3.193 The manufacturer complied, and pickle
sales increased. 94 Unfortunately, the pickle manufacturer, in an ef-
fort to meet the new demand, lowered quality, hurt its brand image,
and eventually filed for bankruptcy. 195 But the irony was that the
188. Id.
189. Id. Two days before the memo story was published in The New York Times, one of
its authors published another report indicating Wal-Mart intended to announce it was
lowering its price of healthcare for its employees so more could take advantage of the
program. Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart to Expand Health Plan for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17289375. He noted, however, that those changes might
not prove to be a benefit to the workers because, while more would be eligible, the
deductibles and employee's contribution would increase as well. Id. ("Several health
insurance specialists questioned whether the company, which is working to burnish its
public image, was trying to quickly increase the number of workers who use its health
insurance at the expense of the coverage's quality.").
190. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 5 ("Wal-Mart has changed the lens through which we
see the world.").
191. Sheehy, supra note 165, at 41 ("Consumers are free to choose whatever they like,
provided Wal-Mart has agreed to provide it.").
192. Id. at 45-46.
193. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 80; Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart You Don't Know,
FAST COMPANY (Dec. 2003), at 68, available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/77/
walmart.html.
194. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 80 ("It was an abundance of abundance. 'They went
through the roof.'").
195. Id. at 81 ("The gallon jar of pickles became what you might call a 'devastating
success' for Vlasic. 'Quickly it started cannibalizing our non-Wal-Mart business.'"); see id.
36 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 4:1:1
whole process was merely a marketing gimmick of limited value to the
consumer-families could not eat a super-size jar of pickles and ended
up throwing most of the reduced-cost items away.196 Yet, because Wal-
Mart priced the jar so low, consumers were fooled into believing they
needed a gigantic jar of pickles. 197 Similarly, one Wal-Mart supplier
recalled looking at inventory reports, noting that sales were outpacing
population growth, "'and wondering where the hell that stuff was go-
ing." ' 198 The suppliers eventually came to the conclusion that the
items (in that case underwear), were so cheap that people bought ex-
cess and simply stored the items in their houses.199 In short, Wal-Mart
has the power to manipulate our way of thinking and our behavior.
Even people who hate Wal-Mart continue to shop there because
it has such a stronghold on our ability to afford goods. One study
showed that of the four types of shoppers, which consist of champions
(those who love Wal-Mart), enthusiasts (those who shop often and feel
positively about it), conflicted (those who actively dislike the store be-
cause of its negative impacts), and rejecters (those who do not shop
there), the conflicted group-shoppers that actively dislike Wal-Mart-
are its second most-frequent customers and spent nearly as much
money each week as its champions. 20 0 Thus, even shoppers who dis-
like the store return week after week to take advantage of its low costs.
The store's stronghold on consumer shopping behavior is so great peo-
ple shop there even when they would otherwise choose not to do so.
at 84 ("Right after the gallon was pulled out of the stores, in January 2001, Vlasic filed for
bankruptcy."). Vlasic was not the only casualty. "[O]fWal-Mart's top ten suppliers in 1994,
four have sought bankruptcy." Barry C. Lynn, Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case
Against Wal-Mart, HARPER'S MAG., (July 2006), at 35, available at http://www.harpers.org/
archive/2006/07/081115. The problem is the "collapsing profit margins of the firms caught
in the Wal-Mart system."
196. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 81 ("'[Consumers would] eat a quarter of a jar and
throw the thing away when they got moldy. A family can't eat them fast enough.'"); see also
id. at 81.
197. Sheehy, supra note 165, at 46. Buying an over-sized jar of pickles is just one tiny
example of Wal-Mart's power to influence consumer spending. According to Sheehy, while
Wal-Mart's mantra is effectively pushing over-consumption through under-pricing, the US
faithfully follows by being the most over-weight population on the planet and consuming
more goods per capita than any other nation. For a heated discussion of Sheehy's
conclusions, see Gordon Smith, Wal-Mart's Irresponsible Pickle Strategy, Conglomerate
Business Law Economics Society, Dec. 9, 2006 http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/12wal
marts-irresp.html. While economists on the blog argue that Wal-Mart's practices follow
good economic principles, Sheehy argues that manipulating prices that result in waste
implicates more than financial costs-it implicates social costs as well.
198. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 70.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 220.
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It logically follows that Wal-Mart could pressure its customers
into granting consent to unlawful store receipt-checking policies be-
cause Wal-Mart states the practice is the trade-off for low prices.
Consumers willingly comply because they are addicted to or reliant on
the store, particularly in areas where there are no other shopping op-
tions. Wal-Mart's economic power essentially allows it to force consent.
Because it is the biggest corporation in the world, it has the psychologi-
cal power to force consumers to behave as it dictates. Thus, even when
it does not explicitly break the law, it circumvents the law by forcing
customers to give up their own valid causes of action. By modifying
consumer behavior, Wal-Mart ensures false imprisonment law has no
power to change its internal store policies.
Finally, Wal-Mart has a history of ignoring the law when it de-
creases company profits. Perhaps the best example of this practice is
Wal-Mart's anti-union activity. Despite the tremendous influence of
organized unions in the U.S. workforce, Wal-Mart has managed,
through policy and illegal behavior, to prevent unions from infiltrating
its U.S. employee base.20 1 When one group of ten butchers in a single
Wal-Mart store voted to join the United Food and Commercial Workers
union, Wal-Mart responded by removing butcher departments from
180 of its supercenter stores-effectively stopping subsequent union
attempts. 20 2 It also maintains a seventy-person anti-union response
team that is employed to enter any store reporting union discussion
and shut down such activity.20 3 In a similar vein, Wal-Mart has sim-
ply broken the law to oust union supporters from its stores. It has fired
employees in retaliation for discussing unions,20 4 threatened to close
entire stores and lay off all workers, 20 5 transferred and demoted union
sympathizers, 20 6 and prevented the distribution of union informa-
tion.20 7  The National Labor Relations Board found Wal-Mart
"repeatedly broke the law" and has been identified more than 250
times as engaging in union-busting activities. 208 One must presume
201. Hemphill, supra note 163, at 13; see also Hausman, supra note 170, at 2 n.5 ("Wal-
Mart has no unions in the US. It has recently permitted unions in China. A Wal-Mart store
in Quebec, Canada has been involved in a controversy over whether its workers will form a
union.").
202. Id. at 13.
203. Sheehy, supra note 165, at 39 (citing John Rausch, The Cost of Cheap Goods, CATH.
HERALD, Nov. 20, 2003).
204. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 87, 108.
205. Id. at 107.
206. Id. at 88.
207. Id. at 89.
208. Sheehy, supra note 162, at 13; see also ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 357 (noting that
when an employee was illegally fired, the NLRB ordered Wal-Mart to "stop breaking the
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the incredible resistance to union organization, at the expense of illegal
anti-union activity, has been pursued to keep employee wages (a large
cost of retail business) down. When union-busting laws get in the way,
Wal-Mart simply ignores them. The law has no deterrent effect-to
date, no union has infiltrated the 1.3 million U.S. Wal-Mart employees
despite the recognition of Wal-Mart's illegal practices. But violating
union regulations is only one example of how Wal-Mart shuns legal
limitations to increase its profits.
Other alleged illegal activity is rampant: violating child-labor
laws, 20 9 failing to pay overtime and past-due wages, 210 forcing employ-
ees to work off the clock,2 11 engaging in anti-trust activities, 212 paying
for signature-gathering to influence referendum votes. 213 Other viola-
tions include employing illegal workers,21 4 violating fair-trade laws by
selling products below cost,215 using predatory pricing to drive compet-
itors out of business, 21 6 deceiving customers into believing they Were
getting a better price than at other stores. 21 7 Additionally, interfering
law, ... [but] [u]nder the weak federal labor laws, this is about as tough an action as the
board could take").
209. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 223-29, 318-45 (discussing Wal-Mart executive David
Glass's disastrous interview with Dateline NBC where he was first confronted publicly with
child-labor violations, findings of human-rights organizations that Wal-Mart exploited
child, prison, and slave labor, and Kathie Lee Gifford's traumatic realization that her
clothing line, supplied for Wal-Mart, used the same).
210. Id. at 318-45, 351. ORTEGA, supra note 2. A group of 150 pharmacists sued Wal-
Mart for unpaid overtime. Wal-Mart argued the pharmacists were salaried employees, and
therefore ineligible for overtime pay. The pharmacists pointed out, however, that if a
department was slow, they were forced to go home and their pay was docked for un-worked
hours. Thus, they were considered hourly if they worked less than 40 hours, and salaried
when they worked more.
211. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 27, 47.
212. Lynn, supra note 195, at 30 (noting that while Wal-Mart is not a monopoly, which
can demand unfair high prices, it is a monospsony, which can dictate price to suppliers who
have no other retail outlet).
213. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 173.
214. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 48; see also Rosen, supra note 174, at 276 (citing
Associated Press, Wal-Mart Pays $11M to Settle Illegal Immigrant Janitors Case, USA
TODAY, Mar. 18, 2005, available at http://yahoo.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2005-
03-18-wal-mart-immigrantsx.htm?csp=l.); Barbaro, Wal-Mart to Pay $11 Million, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48612-2005
Marl8?language=printer; Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Raids by U.S. Aimed at Illegal
Aliens, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, available at 2003 WLNR 5655166.
215. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 174.
216. Id. at 266.
217. Id. at 268. Wal-Mart would use its buying clout to make suppliers give it special
packaging that let it seem to be selling less when it wasn't. For example, Hills Brothers
made special coffee cans for Wal-Mart that looked like the cans Hills sold elsewhere, but
that held 5 ounces less coffee-letting Wal-Mart advertise a lower price for what looked like
the same product but wasn't.
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with contracts to squeeze competitors out of prime real-estate, 218 ter-
minating employees for dating on their own time, 219 committing civil
fraud against its own vendors, 220 investigating employees through ille-
gal electronic eavesdropping, 221 abusing discovery rules, 222 and
engaging in "sweetheart" deals for family and friends 223 have also
taken place.
Wal-Mart is now the defendant in the largest class action law-
suit in history for its alleged gender discrimination against its 1.6
million current and former female employees. 224 The chief complaint
made by the plaintiffs was that, despite "'thousands of discrimination
complaints,'" the store was simply eating the litigation cost of its ille-
gal personnel activities. 225 In essence, "Wal-Mart considered itself
sufficiently immune to the pressure of repeated claims that it did not
feel the need to strategize for the rules."
226
Nevertheless, at least one of its illegal policies turned deadly,
still with no true repercussions for the company: In 1992, an employee
restocking shelves during the night shift collapsed with heart
trouble. 227 At that time, Wal-Mart policy required that night-shift em-
ployees be locked inside the store, with no means to escape, for the
purpose of reducing employee theft.228 On this occasion, when the em-
ployee collapsed, paramedics were unable to respond until after the
218. Id. at 269.
219. Id. at 359.
220. Id. at 375.
221. Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F.3d 711, 713 (1st Cir. 1999); VanderVelde,
supra note 8, at 33.
222. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. 2003) (disposing of
evidence so an injured customer could not prove his prima facia case); GTFM, Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. No. 98-CIV-7724, 2000 WL 335558 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (failing to
produce documents and hiding others in over-burdensome discovery responses);
VanderVelde, supra note 8, at 36-37.
223. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 235.
224. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 2009 WL 365818
(9th Cir. 2009); see also LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK
BATTLE FOR WORKER'S RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004); FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 27; Rosen,
supra note 174, at 278.
225. VanderVelde, supra note 8, at 28 (quoting Joseph M. Sellers, co-counsel for the
Plaintiffs in a suit against Wal-Mart) (alteration in original).
226. Id. It is not just legal restraints Wal-Mart has outgrown. "[It] is increasingly
beyond the control of market forces that capitalism relies on to enforce fair play. Wal-Mart
isn't subject to the market forces because it is creating them."; see FISHMAN, supra note 31,
at 236.
227. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 363.
228. Id. The Wal-Mart spokeswoman argued at the time that the true policy purpose
was employee safety, not reduction of theft. FISHMAN, supra note 31, at 266. But The New
York Times reported that store managers admitted the policy was solely to reduce employee
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police drove to a manager's home to get a key. 229 The employee died. 230
Wal-Mart, despite an investigation by the Federal Health and Safety
Commission, suffered little consequence-a meager fine and a $6,600
worker's compensation benefit to the family.231 While the incident did
prompt Wal-Mart to change its policy of involuntary lockdowns, it took
an employee death to make it happen.
In light of such practices, it is probably safe to presume that
Wal-Mart and other big-box stores have the power to shape consumer
behavior as it relates to the unlawful practice of receipt-checking. The
store can use its economic power to socially and psychologically pres-
sure consumers into giving consent. If that does not work, it can break
the law and simply force compliance. While it may not be able to dis-
card the settled law of false imprisonment and shopkeeper's license on
its face, as a practical matter, receipt-checking policies likely will con-
tinue until the stores decide economic benefits (not legal liability) fail
to justify them.
Union-busting regulations and child-labor laws did not stop
Wal-Mart's unprecedented and relentless use of the illegal practices,
both here and abroad. Instead, only bad press, public backlash, and
loss of sales prompted Wal-Mart to even acknowledge the latter is-
sue.232 Furthermore, the company has simply ignored the law.
Likewise, the tort of false imprisonment is not powerful enough
to stop receipt-checking policies implemented by stores with large eco-
nomic power. One commentator noted that "since the Reagan
Administration, the only effective constraints on Wal-Mart have been
set by investors and revenue flow." 233 We, through our unprecedented
spending at the store, have given it unprecedented power. The law
simply is not powerful enough to stop it. Like the anti-union and mo-
nopoly strategies that have come before it, the power of individualized
false imprisonment lawsuits are not enough to shift Wal-Mart from en-
theft. Steven Greenhouse, Workers Assail Night Lock-ins by Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan.
18, 2004), available at 2004 NLNR 5815456.
229. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 363.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. ORTEGA, supra note 1, at 223-29, 318-45. Even then, its solution has been
ineffective-it shifted responsibility for worker conditions to local factories, publically
declared that it would no longer support such practices, and then turned a blind-eye to its
continued use. Id.
233. Lynn, supra note 195, at 34.
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gaging in its profitable activities. 234 Instead, only consumer action, or
voting with our dollars, can change its practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Receipt-checking, though seemingly well-settled under doc-
trines of false imprisonment and shopkeeper's license, has become a
rallying point for advocates claiming Goliath-like big-box stores are de-
stroying personal liberties. Most troubling, however, is the possibility
that the big-box stores know the illegality of their receipt-checking
practices but choose to ignore any risk in favor of a policy that reduces
theft. From a pragmatic perspective, they will only do so because the
economic benefit outweighs the legal risks. Retailers will take advan-
tage of every shrinkage-reducing policy they can, but they also
deliberately break the law as a matter of policy if it improves the bot-
tom line.
As long as consumers consent to unlawful policies so they can
get a better price, these stores have no incentive to change. When con-
sumers assert their rights, even to the extent of filing false
imprisonment suits against the retailer, litigation costs are so low the
store can write it off as a cost of doing business. Instead, the only
mechanism of change that the big-box stores will bend to is consumer
dissatisfaction. Litigation may not prevent unlawful detentions re-
lated to receipt-checking, but enough consumers complaining just
might.
This single tort, and its inability to keep big-box stores in check,
is an example of how consumer power, instead of the law, has become
the dominant check on the intrusion on personal rights. Just as multi-
ple commentators have noted the social costs we pay for the big-box
stores' low prices, so too are we paying costs in terms of personal free-
doms and the law. The un-checked result of our consumerism and
social conformity is that consumers must simply hand over their re-
ceipts, or pay the price by just saying "No."
234. Sheehy, supra note 165, at 49 ("Wal-Mart is culpable neither in business terms,
nor, except as identified in the actual, pending and potential lawsuits, in legal terms.").
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